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53 
OPTIMAL POLITICAL CONTROL 
OF THE BUREAUCRACY 
Matthew C. Stephenson* 
It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from 
the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits or justi-
fications, reduces the agency’s responsiveness to the preferences of 
political majorities. This Article argues, to the contrary, that a 
moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control 
alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian prob-
lems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. An elected politician, 
though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost always 
deviate from the majority in one direction or the other. Therefore, 
even if the average policy position of a given elected official tends 
to track the policy views of the median voter in the electorate, the 
average divergence between the preferences of that official and the 
median voter in the electorate is generally greater than zero. Forc-
ing the politically responsive official to share power with a partially 
insulated bureaucracy can reduce the variance in policy outcomes, 
because bureaucratic insulation creates a kind of compensatory in-
ertia that mutes the significance of variation in the elected official’s 
policy preferences. Up to a point, the median voter’s benefit from 
this reduction in outcome variance outweighs the costs associated 
with biasing the expected outcome away from the median voter’s 
ideal policy. 
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Introduction 
The degree to which elected politicians ought to influence bureaucratic 
policymaking is one of the most important and contested questions in public 
law. A prominent school of thought—endorsed by influential scholars, prac-
titioners, and public servants—maintains that increasing political influence 
over the bureaucracy enhances the majoritarian legitimacy of the administra-
tive state, while insulation of the bureaucracy from political control 
(whatever its other benefits or justifications) is necessarily “countermajori-
tarian” and therefore problematic. This conclusion is supported by a simple, 
powerful, and intuitive argument: most bureaucratic policy choices involve 
fundamentally political value trade-offs, and in a democracy there is a 
strong presumption that such choices should reflect the interests of electoral 
majorities. Elected politicians—for example, the president—tend to respond 
to majoritarian interests; appointed bureaucrats are much less responsive. It 
therefore seems self-evident that giving politicians greater influence over 
agencies, all else equal, will always increase the degree to which agency 
decisions reflect majoritarian preferences. 
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This Article argues that this seemingly obvious conclusion is false: a 
moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation alleviates rather than exacerbates 
the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. 
Even if elected politicians are more responsive to voters than are agencies, 
and even if agencies do not have any special expertise or other advantages, a 
majority of the electorate is still better off with some degree of bureaucratic 
insulation from political control. The reason has to do with the fact that an 
elected politician, though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost 
always deviate from the majority in one direction or the other. Republican 
presidents, for example, are almost always more conservative than a major-
ity of the electorate, while Democratic presidents are typically more liberal. 
So even if the average policy position of presidential administrations tends 
to track the policy views of the median voter in the electorate, the average 
divergence between the preferences of the median voter and the president is 
generally greater than zero. Forcing the politically responsive president to 
share power with a partially insulated, politically unresponsive bureaucracy 
tends to reduce the variance in policy outcomes, because bureaucratic insu-
lation creates a kind of compensatory inertia that mutes the significance of 
variation in the president’s policy preferences. Up to a point, the benefit to a 
majority of voters from a reduction in outcome variance outweighs the cost 
associated with biasing the expected outcome away from the median voter’s 
ideal outcome. A majority of voters therefore prefers a moderate level of 
bureaucratic insulation from political control. 
This result contrasts sharply with the received wisdom that majoritarian 
values are best served by maximizing the degree to which politically re-
sponsive elected officials can control unaccountable bureaucrats. It is 
important to stress, though, that the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation 
has the expected relationship with other political and institutional variables. 
The more responsive an elected politician is to majoritarian preferences, the 
lower the majority’s optimal level of bureaucratic insulation. Likewise, the 
greater the bureaucracy’s expected policy bias, the lower the optimal level of 
bureaucratic insulation. And the more voter preferences tend to shift over 
time—or, equivalently, the more serving a majority’s interests may require 
sudden and dramatic policy changes—the lower the optimal level of bureau-
cratic insulation. These comparative results, however, do not alter the fact 
that, except in special cases, the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation will 
be positive. 
This Article develops the central argument and several extensions using 
a positive political theory (“PPT”) framework. Part I surveys existing schol-
arship. With very few exceptions, the conventional wisdom is that if one 
presumes that (1) politicians are responsive to majoritarian preferences, (2) 
bureaucrats are not, (3) bureaucrats do not have special expertise or other 
advantages that would be undermined by greater political control, and (4) 
responsiveness to majoritarian preferences is the only relevant normative 
criterion, then elected politicians should have maximum influence over bu-
reaucratic policymaking, except in special circumstances. Part II, the heart 
of the Article, assesses this conventional wisdom using a stylized PPT STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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framework. Section II.A lays out the normative and positive assumptions 
that structure this analysis. Section II.B derives the optimal degree of bu-
reaucratic insulation under these assumptions. This analysis establishes the 
main result: except in special cases, majoritarian values are best served by a 
degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control. Because this base-
line analysis incorporates a number of strong simplifying assumptions, 
Section II.C considers several extensions. These variants generate additional 
insights, but they do not substantially undermine the central claim that po-
litical majorities often prefer to limit the influence of accountable politicians 
over unaccountable bureaucrats. A technical appendix presents the formal 
model on which the analysis and conclusions in the body of the Article are 
based. 
I. The Conventional Wisdom 
Many distinguished scholars and practitioners believe that it is illegiti-
mate and undesirable for bureaucrats to pursue policy goals that diverge 
from those of the nation’s elected representatives. Over thirty years ago, 
Lloyd Cutler and David Johnson concisely summarized this view by defin-
ing a “regulatory failure” as a situation in which “an agency has not done 
what elected officials would have done had they exercised the power con-
ferred on them by virtue of their ultimate political responsibility.”
1 In other 
words, agencies fail “when they reach substantive policy decisions . . . that 
do not coincide with what the politically accountable branches of govern-
ment would have done if they possessed the time, the information, and the 
will to make such decisions.”
2 This definition of bureaucratic failure rests on 
two premises, one normative and the other positive. The normative premise 
is that regulatory policy should be maximally responsive to the preferences 
of a majority of the electorate. The positive premise is that the best way to 
assure bureaucratic responsiveness to majoritarian preferences is to make 
agency policy choices as responsive as possible to the preferences of the 
elected political leadership.  
The normative premise that democratic institutions should generally 
maximize majoritarian responsiveness is vulnerable to a variety of criti-
cisms, including the claims that one cannot ascribe coherent preferences to a 
collective body,
3 that majoritarianism may actually reduce aggregate voter 
                                                                                                                      
  1.  Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 Yale L.J. 
1395, 1399 (1975). 
 2.  Id. 
  3.  This challenge is based on social choice theory findings that, at least for multidimen-
sional issues, it is impossible to aggregate individual preferences into coherent social preferences 
without sacrificing either democratic decision making or weak rationality criteria. See Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951); cf. Richard McKelvey, Intransitivities in 
Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. Econ. Theory 
472 (1976) (showing that, for multidimensional issues, sophisticated agenda setters can manipulate 
the order of majority votes to get any outcome, no matter the distribution of voter preferences). 
Some believe these findings imply that one cannot speak coherently of the “intent” or “preference” 
of a collective body such as an electorate or legislature. See  William H. Riker, Liberalism STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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welfare,
4 and that political institutions should advance normative goals other 
than satisfaction of the preferences of current electoral majorities.
5 This Ar-
ticle brackets these objections and provisionally assumes, consistent with 
much of the existing literature advocating extensive political control of the 
bureaucracy, that majoritarianism is a legitimate and coherent institutional 
goal. 
What about the positive premise—that if majoritarianism is our objec-
tive, we should confer as much authority as possible on politically 
accountable elected officials? The notion that one can increase the political 
responsiveness of bureaucratic decisions by increasing the influence of the 
most politically responsive decision maker commands widespread accep-
tance. Richard Pierce, for example, states that political control over agency 
decisions is desirable because “[p]olicy decisions should be made by the 
most politically accountable institution available.”
6 Similarly, Peter Strauss 
and Cass Sunstein assert that “[f]or those who believe that regulatory issues 
present questions to be resolved ‘politically’—in accordance with (in-
formed) constituent desires—decisionmaking power should be placed in the 
hands of those most accountable to the public.”
7 
Of course, most political-control advocates concede that it is too costly 
to eliminate bureaucratic insulation completely. The fact that elected offi-
cials have limited time and expertise, for example, may make some de facto 
bureaucratic autonomy inevitable.
8 Furthermore, aggressive political   
                                                                                                                      
against Populism (1982); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative 
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239 (1992). Others, however, reject the conclusion 
that these social-choice results undermine the normative coherence of majoritarianism. See Gerry 
Mackie, Democracy Defended (2003); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging 
Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. 
L. Rev. 2121 (1990). And others have argued that, whatever the theoretical problems with multidi-
mensional democratic choice, most real-world political issues appear to be one-dimensional, with a 
stable majority and a stable minority on each side, and that on these issues it is meaningful to speak 
of what the majority prefers. See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Politi-
cal-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (1997); John Mark Hansen, Individuals, 
Institutions, and Public Preferences over Public Finance, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 513 (1998). 
  4.  This may occur if the marginal cost to the median voter of supplying a public good dif-
fers from the total marginal social cost. See  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public 
Sector 137–41 (3d ed. 2000). Another hypothesis is that political competition in a majoritarian 
system leads to inefficient redistribution, retarding long-term growth. See Samuel P. Huntington & 
Jorge I. Dominguez, Political Development, in 3 Handbook of Political Science 60 (Fred I. 
Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975). Additionally, some have argued that systematic cogni-
tive biases lead a majority of voters to demand inefficient policies. See Bryan Caplan, The Myth 
of the Rational Voter (2007). 
  5.  Possible normative constraints on majoritarian decision making include protecting the 
interests of those who are not represented, or cannot adequately protect their interests, in the politi-
cal process, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980), and advancing a conception of 
the public good that incorporates more than the welfare of individual voters, see Ronald Dworkin, 
Freedom’s Law (1996). 
  6.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative 
Law, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 469, 520 (1985). 
  7.  Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal 
Rulemaking, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 181, 183 (1986). 
 8.  See Jeffrey S. Banks & Barry R. Weingast, The Political Control of Bureaucracies under 
Asymmetric Information, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 509 (1992); David B. Spence, Agency Policy Making STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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monitoring that deprives agencies of policymaking autonomy may erode 
agency incentives to invest in expertise, thereby raising the costs to elected 
politicians of acquiring policy-relevant information.
9 These informational 
considerations may induce even committed majoritarians to tolerate some 
degree of bureaucratic autonomy. But this “agency slack” is viewed as ac-
ceptable only if the costs (to majoritarian interests) of bringing the 
bureaucracy to heel are too high. Furthermore, these informational argu-
ments do not necessarily undermine the claim that majoritiarian interests are 
best served by giving politicians maximum authority over bureaucratic pol-
icy, because the politicians themselves may choose to give agencies a degree 
of autonomy if doing so would serve majoritarian interests. 
Scholars have also identified special circumstances in which the satis-
faction of majoritarian preferences may require a degree of bureaucratic 
independence from political control. For example, a time-consistency prob-
lem, also known as a credible commitment problem, may provide a 
majoritarian justification for insulating central banks, the judiciary, and 
some public utility commissions from direct political control.
10 Some level 
of bureaucratic insulation may also improve voter welfare by reducing po-
litical risk.
11 Additionally, the insulation of certain institutions—such as 
courts or legislative districting commissions—may be important for ensur-
ing that elected politicians remain sufficiently responsive to majoritarian 
interests.
12 But these are special cases. For the mine-run of bureaucratic pol-
icy decisions—from environmental protection to workplace safety to 
criminal prosecution to food and drug regulation—the conventional view is 
that giving maximum authority to the most politically responsive decision 
maker maximizes the responsiveness of policy to majoritarian preferences. 
This general view may imply a variety of legal and institutional con-
clusions. Some believe that the need to put politically accountable officials 
in charge of bureaucratic policy demands a revitalization of the nondelega-
tion doctrine. On this view, Congress is too eager to delegate authority to 
                                                                                                                      
and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem, 7 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 
199 (1997). 
 9.  See Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. 
Pol. Econ. 1 (1997); Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 293 (2004); Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, 
Policy Discretion and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 873 (2007); cf. Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 
Yale L.J. 2314, 2324–27 (2006) (arguing that excessive presidential control of agencies can reduce 
the flow of valuable information from agencies to the president). 
 10.  See Witold Jerzy Henisz, Political Institutions and Policy Volatility, 16 Econ. & Pol. 1 
(2004); Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 473 (1977); Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foun-
dations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 
J.L. Econ. & Org. 201 (1994). 
 11.  See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, 
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1036 (2006). 
 12.  See Ely, supra note 5; Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 
Harv. L. Rev. 593, 643–48 (2002); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term, Foreword: 
The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 28 (2004). STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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unaccountable bureaucrats who cater to narrow interests rather than broad 
majorities. According to nondelegation advocates, if Congress could not 
transfer responsibility for making fundamental policy decisions, Congress 
would make more of these decisions through the legislative process and 
would be held accountable for its choices.
13 The plausibility of this claim 
has been vigorously challenged,
14 and the strong form of the nondelegation 
view has virtually no traction under current doctrine.
15 Nonetheless, argu-
ments that emphasize Congress’s relatively greater majoritarian 
responsiveness may provide support for the judicial application of “non-
delegation canons” of statutory construction.
16 Moreover, some scholars 
have suggested that administrative procedures and interpretive default 
rules can and should increase the control of the current Congress over 
regulatory policy, even—or perhaps especially—if broad delegations are 
considered legitimate.
17 
Proponents of strong presidential control over the administration also ar-
gue for maximum feasible political responsiveness in bureaucratic 
policymaking. Scholars with diverse ideological and methodological com-
mitments have asserted that the two premises discussed above—that 
bureaucratic policy should track majoritarian values and that this goal is best 
advanced by giving decision-making authority to the most politically account-
able officials—imply the need for presidential control over bureaucratic 
policymaking, because the president is the institutional actor most responsive 
to the preferences of a national majority. Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, 
for example, posit that presidential control over the bureaucracy is necessary 
to serve the constitutional commitment to political accountability because, “to 
the extent that an agency official makes discretionary decisions about the con-
tent of public policy, the best reading of the constitutional plan is that in 
                                                                                                                      
 13.  See Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (1969); David Schoenbrod, Power 
Without Responsibility (1993); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 
Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1982); Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 663 (2004); cf. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–
88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034–40 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999), rev’d sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 14.  See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separa-
tion of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 947 (1999); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81 
(1985); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1721 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 
20 Cardozo L. Rev. 775 (1999); Mark Seidenfeld, Pyrrhic Political Penalties: Why the Public 
Would Lose Under the “Penalty Default Canon”, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 724 (2004). 
 15.  See Whitman, 531 U.S. 457; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 16.  See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 223; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315 (2000); Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); 
Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (plurality opinion). 
 17.  See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1749 (2007); cf. Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules (2008) (arguing that courts can 
and should use interpretive default rules that implement the policies that are most likely to be enactable 
by the current president and Congress, if courts can reliably infer these policies from official action). STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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general, the official may not be insulated from presidential supervision.”
18 
Putting Lessig and Sunstein’s constitutional views to one side, numerous 
other experts agree that the political responsiveness of bureaucratic policy to 
the preferences of the national electorate correlates strongly with presiden-
tial control of the administration. In addition to Lessig and Sunstein, 
prominent proponents of this hypothesis include James Blumstein,
19 Steven 
Calabresi,
20 Philip Harter,
21 Elena Kagan,
22 Jerry Mashaw,
23 Richard Pierce,
24 
and Peter Strauss.
25  
                                                                                                                      
  18.  Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1, 103 (1994); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administration, 1987 
BYU L. Rev. 927, 938 (1987). Lessig and Sunstein argue that the Framers did not believe the Con-
stitution required a unitary executive, but that this is because they failed to anticipate the 
inescapably political nature of bureaucratic decision making in the modern administrative state. 
Lessig & Sunstein, supra, at 102–03.  
 19.  E.g., James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An 
Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 Duke L.J. 851, 885 (2001) (“An administration 
whose policies and goals may be out of sync with the culture or values of an agency . . . is well advised 
to improve the oversight role of its political appointees . . . . It is fair for this point to travel under the 
label of improved political accountability.”); id. at 887 (“Given that agency rulemaking does contem-
plate a role for political input . . . it becomes hard to see why a presidential administration should not 
direct or at least influence its agents’ exercise of discretion within the agency bureaucracy.”). 
 20.  E.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
Ark. L. Rev. 23, 67 (1995). Calabresi states: 
The President of the United States and his subordinates are the conscious agents of . . . a na-
tional majority coalition. If that coalition will, by its very nature, be likely to be moderate, 
temperate, and just, so too will its agent be likely to be moderate, temperate, and just. . . . 
[M]ost presidents . . . will work every day they are in office to try to keep their policies in ac-
cord with the wise and benevolent preferences of the national majority . . . . 
Id. 
 21.  E.g., Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger, 
36 Am. U. L. Rev. 557, 568 (1987) (“We vote for presidents, not secretaries or administrators. . . . 
White House oversight places accountability precisely where it should be, namely, where the elec-
torate can do something about it.”). He continues:  
Presidential oversight . . . . broadens what may be an unduly parochial approach by an agency and 
helps the agency take other values into account when reaching important decisions. . . . Presiden-
tial oversight is a means of incorporating the prevailing political climate into an agency’s 
discretion while maintaining allegiance to the relevant factors defined in the legislation. 
Id. at 570–71. 
 22.  E.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2384 (2001) 
(“Presidential administration . . . advances political accountability by subjecting the bureaucracy to 
the control mechanism most open to public examination and most responsive to public opinion.”). 
 23.  E.g., Mashaw, supra note 14, at 95–96. He states: 
[T]he utilization of vague delegations to administrative agencies . . . [is] a device for facilitating 
responsiveness to voter preferences expressed in presidential elections. . . . [O]ne can reasonably 
expect that a president will be able to affect policy in a four-year term only because being elected 
president entails acquiring the power to exercise, direct, or influence policy discretion. 
Id.; accord Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, & Governance 152–53 (1997). 
 24.  E.g., Pierce, supra note 6, at 508 (“Presidents are elected presumably because they share the 
policy preferences of a majority of citizens. It follows that they should be permitted to determine social 
policy within whatever boundaries Congress has established.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the 
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1239 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Pierce, Agency Theory]. 
 25.  E.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 190 (1986). Strauss and Sunstein write: STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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Some of those who support strong presidentialism on majoritarian 
grounds believe that the Constitution, sound institutional-design principles, 
or both require a “unitary executive” in which the president has complete 
authority over all aspects of the administration.
26 Other strong presidential-
ists do not take their conclusions quite this far, but this is not because they 
reject the premise that presidential control maximizes the political respon-
siveness of bureaucratic policy. Rather the allowance for some degree of 
bureaucratic insulation from the president is a concession to values other 
than majoritarian responsiveness. Elena Kagan is explicit about this. After 
noting that individuals and institutions other than the president (including 
interest groups, congressional committees, and the agencies themselves) 
have a “far more tenuous connection to national majoritarian preferences 
and interests,” Kagan nonetheless allows that these entities “may have im-
portant roles to play and contributions to make in the administrative 
process.”
27 But, she explains, this is only because “responsiveness to the 
general electorate is not the sole criterion by which to assess administrative 
action.”
28 On the dimension of political responsiveness to the electorate, Ka-
gan is unequivocal that “the President holds the comparative advantage.”
29 
Thus she concludes that, “given the current ubiquity of broad delegations, 
[democratic] values support the strongest feasible presidential control of 
administrative decisions.”
30 Strauss and Sunstein take a similar approach. 
They acknowledge a need to maintain “tension” between the “neutral exper-
tise” and “political” views of regulation,
31 and they admit some role for the 
former in shaping procedural constraints on the president’s authority to di-
rect the administration. That said, Strauss and Sunstein are quite clear that 
on the dimension of political responsiveness, presidential control over the 
bureaucracy is always a benefit.
32 The implication is that the more one cares 
about majoritarianism, the more one ought to favor presidential control over 
the administration. 
The view that increasing presidential control over the administration 
would increase the political responsiveness of agency policy may imply a  
 
                                                                                                                      
[T]he President . . . [is] uniquely well-situated to design regulatory policy in a way that is respon-
sive to the interests of the public as a whole. Agency officials, by contrast, are only indirectly 
accountable. . . . For these reasons, a supervisory role by the President should help ensure that dis-
cretionary decisions by regulatory agencies are responsive to the public generally. 
Id. Strauss, however, has criticized strong presidentialism on other grounds. See Peter L. Strauss, 
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. 
Rev. 573 (1984); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 965 (1997). 
 26.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Exe-
cute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994); Calabresi, supra note 20. 
 27.  Kagan,  supra note 22, at 2336. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 2337. 
 30.  Id. at 2334 (emphasis added). 
  31.  Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 183. 
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variety of legal or institutional arrangements that reduce bureaucratic insula-
tion from the president, at least to the extent this can be done without 
excessive erosion of other relevant values (such as bureaucratic competence or 
fairness).
33 Versions of the majoritarian responsiveness argument have been 
used to justify, for example, deferential judicial review of agency action on 
questions of both law
34 and policy;
35 conditioning such deference on evi-
dence that the president or her immediate subordinates were involved in 
making the relevant decision;
36 allowing agencies to change their policies 
easily in response to a new president’s political priorities;
37 imposition of 
centralized regulatory review through the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”);
38 allowing the president to issue policy directives to agencies;
39 
shifting the authority within the executive branch to interpret statutes from 
the agencies to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”);
40 increasing the power of 
                                                                                                                      
  33.  This formulation is question-begging insofar as it does not define “competence” or “fair-
ness” precisely or indicate how much erosion of these values would count as “excessive.” Clarifying 
these issues, however, is not necessary to establish the basic point at hand: the strong presidentialists 
assume that, all else equal, the marginal benefit of increased presidential control is generally posi-
tive, and even if there are countervailing concerns, a relatively high degree of presidential control is 
good unless and until these countervailing costs become sufficiently large. 
 34.  See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 129, 190 (2000) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“Insofar as the decision to regulate tobacco reflects the policy of an administration, it 
is a decision for which that administration, and those politically elected officials who support it, 
must (and will) take responsibility.”); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
865 (1984). The Court held in Chevron:  
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the 
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise pol-
icy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to 
make such policy choices . . . . 
Id. For further discussion on this point, see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 978–80 (1992); Pierce, supra note 6, at 520–24; Pierce, Agency 
Theory, supra note 24, at 1255–58; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institu-
tions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 925–28 (2003). 
 35.  See Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Con-
trol of the Bureaucracy 33–34, 62–65, 181–84 (1990); Pierce, Agency Theory, supra note 24, 
at 1259–60, 1263–67. 
 36.  See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 201; Kagan, supra note 22, at 2372–82. 
 37.  See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186–87 (1991); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Matthew C.   
Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Admin-
istrative Agencies, 91 Va. L. Rev. 93, 139–42 (2005). 
 38.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993); Exec. Order No. 12498, 3 C.F.R. 323 
(1985); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Blumstein, supra note 19; 
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Commentary, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075 (1986); John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitu-
tional Restoration, 51 Duke L.J. 901 (2001); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 190. 
 39.  See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 1; Kagan, supra note 22, at 2290–99, 2331–45. 
 40.  See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15   
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White House representatives within agencies;
41 and restricting Congress’s 
ability to limit the president’s removal authority or to delegate to officials 
not under the president’s direct control.
42 
The enthusiasm for presidential control of the administration, however, 
is far from universal. Indeed the critics of strong presidentialism may out-
number the proponents. Yet an interesting feature of the varied and 
vociferous criticisms of strong presidentialism is that few, if any, reject the 
notion that placing decision-making authority with the most politically re-
sponsive officials will increase the majoritarian responsiveness of the 
decisions themselves. Instead, critiques of strong presidentialism tend to 
make one or both of two other claims. 
First, many critics assert the priority of other values, such as “rule of 
law,” “procedural regularity,” or “rationality,” over majoritarian responsive-
ness.
43 Lisa Bressman, for example, has argued that excessive attention to 
political accountability has obscured the importance of preventing arbitrary 
agency decision making.
44 Furthermore, these critics sometimes assert that 
the type of direct responsiveness that strong presidentialists attribute to the 
chief executive can pose a threat to important public values other than ma-
joritarianism.
45 These criticisms, however, do not directly undermine the 
hypothesis that the majoritarian responsiveness of bureaucratic policy corre-
lates positively with the influence of politically accountable elected 
officials. Rather, these critics posit that the costs of presidential control, in 
terms of damage to other values, outweigh whatever majoritarian benefits 
presidential control might confer. 
Second, many critics dispute the claim that the president is more politi-
cally responsive than other institutions to national majorities. Some argue 
that greater presidential control over the administration might actually 
threaten majoritarian values by eroding the influence of Congress, which 
arguably has even stronger majoritarian credentials than the president,
46 or 
                                                                                                                      
 41.  See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007) (amending Executive 
Order 12,866 to require each agency to designate a presidential appointee as the agency’s “Regula-
tory Policy Officer” to supervise agency regulatory plans and ensure compliance with OMB 
supervision); Blumstein, supra note 19. 
 42.  See Calabresi, supra note 20, at 82–86; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 106–08, 
110–14; Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41. 
 43.  See supra note 5. 
 44.  Lisa  Schultz  Bressman,  Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461 (2003); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretion-
ary Justice (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (1965). 
 45.  See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Com-
plex World, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 987, 988, 1004–07 (1997); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1824–25 (1996). 
 46.  See Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 105–06; Flaherty, supra note 45, at 1824–25; Jide 
Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1217 
(2006); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay Cri-
tiquing Presidential Administration, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 29–32 (2007); Peter M. Shane, Political 
Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemak-
ing, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161, 200 (1995); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the 
Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
64  Michigan Law Review  [Vol. 107:53 
 
by undermining an administrative process that does, or could do, a reasona-
bly good job of responding to voter preferences.
47 These concerns are 
exacerbated by the lack of transparency associated with some forms of 
presidential control.
48 Whatever the validity of these criticisms, however, 
none of them rejects the premise that increasing the authority of the most 
majoritarian decision makers over the bureaucracy will increase the majori-
tarian responsiveness of bureaucratic decisions. Indeed the preceding 
criticisms are not targeted at the political responsiveness theory per se, but 
rather at its strong presidentialist variant. 
In sum, the conventional majoritarian case for strong presidentialism 
rests on three premises: (1) political and legal institutions should increase 
the responsiveness of bureaucratic policy to the values held by a majority of 
voters, (2) increasing the relative influence of the most politically account-
able entities over the bureaucracy will increase the majoritarian 
responsiveness of bureaucratic policy, and (3) of our existing institutions, 
the president is the most responsive to majoritarian preferences. Critics of 
strong presidentialism have attacked the first and third premises, but for the 
most part they have left the second intact. Part II of this Article develops a 
simple theoretical framework to assess the idea that maximizing the power 
of the institution most responsive to majoritiarian preferences in fact maxi-
mizes the majoritarian responsiveness of bureaucratic decisions. The 
analysis concludes that this hypothesis is at best seriously incomplete and at 
worst flat-out wrong. 
                                                                                                                      
State, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 165 (1992) (arguing that separation of powers law should shift influence 
from the president to Congress in order to preserve the original constitutional design). 
 47.  See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A 
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 84 (2006); Bressman, 
supra note 17; Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 
98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 59–60 (1998); Katyal, supra note 9, at 2344–45; Richard B. Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1712 (1975). This view is 
related to the claim that the administrative process can foster “civic republicanism.” See Mark Sei-
denfeld,  A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511 
(1992). The main difference is that civic republicans do not view the purpose of the political or 
bureaucratic process simply as aggregating preexisting preferences; rather, they emphasize the role 
of rational deliberation in shaping individual preferences and realizing some collective conception 
of the public good. See id. at 1514. 
 48.  See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 47, at 78–84; Katyal, supra note 9, at 2343–
44; Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 443, 451, 456–57 (1987); Alan B. Morrison, Commentary, OMB Interference with Agency 
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way To Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1064, 1067–68 (1986); 
Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Ex-
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II. Analysis 
A. Assumptions 
1. The Normative Standard 
One problem afflicting much of the literature that invokes the concepts 
of “political responsiveness,” “political accountability,” and “political repre-
sentativeness” is that these malleable terms are not always clearly defined.
49 
This Article adopts a simple, functional definition of political responsive-
ness and treats the closely related concepts of political accountability and 
political representativeness as synonymous.
50 For the purposes of this Arti-
cle, “political responsiveness” is the degree of correspondence between the 
policy the bureaucracy implements and the policy that a majority of the 
electorate would select if the issue were put to a vote. 
More specifically, the analysis assumes that the policy outcome (which 
can be interpreted as a single decision or as the aggregate effect of multiple 
decisions) can be characterized as a point in a one-dimensional space (that 
is, a line). For convenience, one might think of the line as capturing a tradi-
tional left-right (liberal-conservative) policy continuum, but the dimension 
could be anything. The preferences of a majority of the national electorate 
can be represented, in abstracted form, as the preferences of a single median 
voter (referred to simply as the “voter”) with a most-preferred outcome (an 
“ideal point”) in the policy space. The voter’s utility is a decreasing function 
of the distance between the policy outcome and the voter’s ideal point. The 
degree of “expected policy responsiveness” is simply the expected distance 
between the policy outcome and the voter’s ideal point.
51 
The following analysis uses expected policy responsiveness as the ex-
clusive normative criterion to judge different institutional arrangements. 
This is not because policy responsiveness is the only value that legal and 
political institutions ought to respect, but rather because this Article focuses 
on how well different institutional arrangements serve majoritarian values. 
Because much of the case for strong presidentialism (or political control of 
the bureaucracy more generally) rests on claims about advancing majoritiar-
ian responsiveness, it makes sense to put that case on its strongest footing by 
temporarily excluding consideration of other values. 
It is worth noting, however, that the following analysis could proceed in 
exactly the same way if what I refer to as the “voter’s ideal point” were re-
defined as something other than the median voter’s most preferred policy. 
                                                                                                                      
 49.  See Farina, supra note 45, at 988, 992–1007; Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability 
and the Anti-administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2073 (2005); Shane, supra note 46, 
at 196. 
 50.  But see Rubin, supra note 49, at 2078. 
  51.  In the formal model presented in Section B of the Appendix, the voter’s ideal point is v1, 
the policy ultimately implemented is x1, and the voter’s utility is −(x1−v1)². Expected policy respon-
siveness is E(–(x1−v1)²). See infra Section B.1 of the Appendix. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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For example, one could define this point as the policy that maximizes ag-
gregate voter welfare, the policy that most closely approximates what the 
policy outcome would have been under the original understanding of the 
Constitution’s decision-making process, or some other definition of the “op-
timal democratic outcome.” As long as the positive assumptions outlined in 
the next subsection hold, the main substantive conclusions will also hold. 
While little in the analysis depends on identifying the optimal democratic 
outcome with the median voter’s ideal point, this identity is often made or 
assumed in discussions of the appropriate degree of political control over 
agencies, and so I will use this terminology for expositional convenience. 
2. The Positive Framework  
This Article considers a stylized model of bureaucratic policymaking 
that includes two, and only two, government decision makers: an elected 
politician, referred to as the president, and an unelected bureaucracy. It is 
important to emphasize that the decision to label the elected politician the 
“president” is purely for expositional convenience. The analytical frame-
work would apply in exactly the same way if this actor were labeled 
“Congress” or “Congress-plus-the-president.”
52 
The model divides the decision-making process into two stages: an “in-
stitutional design stage” and a “policymaking stage.”
53 In the institutional 
design stage, two important events occur. First, a bureaucracy is created. 
The bureaucracy’s initial ideal point may diverge from the voter’s initial 
ideal point by some amount, and the magnitude of this distance is the “ini-
tial bureaucratic bias.”
54 Second, institutional rules are established, and these 
rules determine the degree of “bureaucratic insulation” from presidential 
control.
55 
At the beginning of the policymaking stage, the voter’s ideal point may 
shift some amount to the left or right; neither direction is more likely ex 
ante. Although the analysis assumes that institutional designers do not know 
which direction voter preferences will shift, or exactly how much, the ex-
pected magnitude of the shift is known at the institutional design stage. We 
                                                                                                                      
  52.  Likewise, the analysis would be qualitatively the same if the politically responsive offi-
cial were labeled “president” and the unresponsive entity were labeled “Congress,” or vice versa. 
The basic framework can apply in any situation in which two actors potentially share responsibility 
for a policy outcome, and one of those two actors is more responsive to voter preferences than the 
other. 
  53.  In the formal analysis, the two stages are denoted by t={0,1}, where t=0 is the institu-
tional design stage and t=1 is the policymaking stage. See infra Section A of the Appendix. 
  54.  In the formal model, the voter’s initial ideal point, v0, is normalized to zero, and initial 
bureaucratic bias is denoted b0. See infra Section A of the Appendix. 
  55.  In the formal analysis, the level of bureaucratic insulation is given by β. See infra Section 
A of the Appendix. While the text implies that the bureaucracy’s initial bias is known when the level 
of bureaucratic insulation is chosen, this assumption is not necessary for the analysis. One could 
assume instead that the bureaucracy’s initial ideal point is realized after the level of bureaucratic 
insulation has been selected. In that case, “initial bureaucratic bias” should be reinterpreted as the 
expected distance (or, more accurately, the expected square of the distance) between the bureauc-
racy’s initial ideal point and the voter’s initial ideal point. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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can use the term “voter preference instability” to characterize the expected 
magnitude of the voter’s preference shift. When voter preferences are stable, 
shifts are likely to be relatively small; when voter preferences are unstable, 
shifts are likely to be relatively large.
56 This feature of the model allows as-
sessment of the claim that political control over the bureaucracy is necessary 
to respond to changes in the voter preferences.
57 
After the voter settles on a new ideal point, the political process deter-
mines the president’s ideal point. The president is politically responsive to 
the electorate in the sense that the president’s (induced) policy preferences 
are positively correlated with the voter’s preferences. More precisely, the 
expected value of the president’s ideal point is equal to the voter’s ideal 
point, and if the voter’s ideal point shifts, the expected value of the presi-
dent’s ideal point shifts as well.
58 Presidential responsiveness to 
majoritiarian preferences may arise because voters select presidents on the 
basis of the candidates’ perceived values and interests, because sitting presi-
dents cater to the preferences of the electorate, or both.
59 
Although the expected value of the president’s ideal point is always 
equal to the voter’s ideal point, there is no guarantee that the president’s 
actual ideal point will match the voter’s ideal point exactly. Indeed, the 
president’s actual ideal point is likely to end up some distance to the left or 
right of the voter’s. After all, no system of political accountability works 
perfectly, and even the most ardent proponents of strong presidentialism 
concede that the president’s policy goals may diverge somewhat from those 
of the median voter.
60 But these presidential deviations from voter prefer-
ences can be treated as a kind of random error, or “noise,” in the political 
process. As Steven Calebresi argues, “the exigencies of the business cycle 
almost guarantee that both of the two major parties will share the Presi-
dency, at least to some degree. This means that relatively permanent 
minority positions on various issues will always enjoy periods where presi-
dential power is friendly and periods where it is not.”
61 From this 
observation, Calebresi concludes that although “some presidents may tem-
porarily become out of touch on [particular regulatory] issues[,] . . . over 
                                                                                                                      
  56.  Formally, the voter’s ideal point in the policymaking stage is v1=v0+ε1, where ε1 is a ran-
dom draw from a known distribution with mean 0 and variance ρ². “Voter preference instability” is 
simply the variance, ρ². See infra Section A of the Appendix. 
 57.  See Calabresi, supra note 20, at 68–69. 
  58.  In the formal analysis, the president’s ideal point is p1=v1+α1, where α1 is a random vari-
able drawn from a known distribution with mean 0 and variance σ
2. See infra Section A of the 
Appendix. 
 59.  Compare Mashaw, supra note 14, at 95 (arguing that citizens select presidents on the 
basis of the candidates’ perceived policy agendas), with Kagan, supra note 22, at 2334–35 (asserting 
that the threat of voter punishment keeps presidential policy roughly in line with majoritarian pref-
erences). For a general discussion contrasting these accountability mechanisms, see James D. 
Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanc-
tioning Poor Performance,  in  Democracy, Accountability, and Representation 55 (Adam 
Przeworski et al. eds., 1999). 
 60.  See Calabresi, supra note 20, at 69–70 & n.114; Kagan, supra note 22, at 2334–37. 
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time these divergences will tend to cancel each other out, producing long 
term accountability.”
62 
We can characterize the average size of the deviation between the presi-
dent’s ideal point and the voter’s ideal point as “expected presidential 
responsiveness.”
63 When expected presidential responsiveness is high, the set 
of likely presidential ideal points is clustered tightly around the voter’s ideal 
point. When expected presidential responsiveness is low, the set of likely 
presidential ideal points is more widely dispersed. In all cases, the probabil-
ity-weighted average of the possible presidential ideal points is equal to the 
voter’s ideal point.  
In contrast to the president’s ideal point, voter preferences do not di-
rectly affect the bureaucracy’s ideal point. Left to its own devices, the 
bureaucracy will continue to pursue the same policy. This assumption, while 
unrealistically strong, captures in stylized form the claim—common in the 
literature advocating greater political control—that bureaucracies suffer 
from a kind of inertia or “arteriosclerosis” that leads them to hew to a par-
ticular policy agenda unless prodded from the outside.
64 Furthermore, the 
analysis could easily be extended to incorporate the possibility that bureau-
cratic policy preferences might be subject to random variation. All one 
would need to do is to redefine the parameter that measures the expected 
random change in the difference between voter preferences and bureaucratic 
preferences from “voter preference instability” to something broader that 
captures both voter preference shifts and bureaucratic preference shifts.
65 
For simplicity, however, the rest of the discussion will proceed under the 
assumption that the bureaucracy’s initial ideal point is fixed. 
While bureaucratic policy preferences are not directly responsive to vot-
er interests, the president—who is responsive to voter interests, at least in 
expectation—has a number of tools at her disposal to shift the bureaucracy’s 
ideal point. These tools include the power to appoint and remove adminis-
trative officials, to manipulate bureaucratic structure and procedures, to 
impose various forms of regulatory review, and to issue directives to agen-
cies, as well as a variety of other, less formal means. The specific tools the 
president might use are not important here. Rather, the important considera-
tion is that it is costly for the president to employ them. This cost is 
typically not a direct expenditure of material resources but instead the op-
portunity cost of the president’s time, attention, and political capital. 
The president’s control cost is proportional to two things: the distance 
the president moves the bureaucracy’s ideal point and the level of bureau-
                                                                                                                      
 62.  Id. at 70 n.114. 
  63.  Formally, expected presidential responsiveness is measured by the variance σ², where 
lower values of σ² correspond to higher levels of expected presidential responsiveness. See infra 
Section A of the Appendix. 
 64.  See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy 158–64 (1967); Louis L. Jaffe, The Effec-
tive Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1109 (1954); 
Kagan, supra note 22, at 2336–37. 
  65.  Section A of the Appendix establishes this point formally. See infra note 97. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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cratic insulation from presidential influence. All else equal, it is more costly 
for the president to effect a large change in bureaucratic preferences than to 
effect a small change. Holding the size of the change constant, the president 
incurs greater control costs when the bureaucracy is more insulated from 
political control. Furthermore, the president’s marginal cost of influencing 
the bureaucracy increases as the size of the policy change becomes larger. 
That is, the cost to the president of moving the bureaucracy two units in a 
given direction is more than twice as large as the cost to the president of 
moving the bureaucracy one unit in that direction.
66 
The assumption of increasing marginal control costs is important to the 
subsequent results, so it is worth pausing to explain its justification. This 
assumption is premised on the notions that bureaucratic control costs are 
primarily opportunity costs—the diversion of time, effort, and political capi-
tal from other activities—and that the president tries to allocate these 
resources efficiently, sacrificing low-value activities before high-value ac-
tivities. Imagine, for purposes of illustration, that the president has 100 units 
of political capital that she allocates to an array of tasks. If the president 
devotes a single unit of capital to influence a particular bureaucratic deci-
sion (so the president devotes 1 unit to bureaucratic control and 99 to other 
tasks), she will sacrifice whichever other activity was least valuable to her; 
to do otherwise would be irrational. The value of that foregone activity is 
the cost of devoting 1 unit of political capital to bureaucratic control. Now 
suppose the president devotes a second unit of political capital to bureau-
cratic control (so that she applies 2 units to bureaucratic control and 98 units 
to other tasks).
67 Because the president has already foregone the   
                                                                                                                      
  66.  In the formal analysis, the president can shift the bureaucracy’s ideal point from b0 to b1 
at utility cost (β/(1−β))(b0−b1)
2. See infra Section A of the Appendix. Section B.1 of the Appendix 
provides a more complete analysis of the president’s equilibrium behavior. This modeling approach 
contrasts with other approaches taken in the social science literature. First, much of the formal lit-
erature on bureaucracy and separation of powers assumes that the principal (such as a voter or 
legislator) faces a dichotomous choice between assigning authority to one institution and assigning 
it to another. See Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single 
Policy Task, 97 Am. Econ. Rev. 169 (2007); Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, The Politician and the 
Judge: Accountability in Government, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 1034 (2004); Stephenson, supra note 11. 
Second, much of the literature assumes either that the principal can revise or reject its agent’s pro-
posal costlessly or that the principal bears a fixed cost for altering the agent’s decision. See Pablo T. 
Spiller, Agency Discretion Under Judicial Review, 16 Mathematical Computer Modelling 185, 
193–95 (1992); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and 
Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 349, 354–56 (1999). In contrast, this 
Article assumes that the president and the bureaucracy share joint responsibility for the policy out-
come, and that the president’s control cost is an increasing function of how much the president 
changes the final outcome from what the bureaucracy initially preferred. For a similar modeling 
approach in a different but related substantive context, see Alan E. Wiseman, Delegation and Posi-
tive-Sum Bureaucracies (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Stud., Working Paper No. 07-05), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1004313. 
  67.  This discussion assumes that the amount of bureaucratic preference change is a linear 
function of the number of political capital units that the president devotes to bureaucratic control. 
That assumption is implicit in the formal model in the Appendix. One might argue, however, that if 
the bureaucracy also faces increasing marginal costs from undesirable policy outcomes, then the 
bureaucracy would resist change more strenuously when the president tries to shift the bureaucracy 
a greater distance from its initial ideal point. If so, this would strengthen the case for assuming that STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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lowest-valued of her original set of alternative activities, the opportunity 
cost of devoting this second unit of political capital to bureaucratic control 
will be higher than the opportunity cost of the first unit. Hence, the cost to 
the president of devoting 2 units of political capital to bureaucratic control is 
more than twice as great as the cost of devoting 1 unit to bureaucratic con-
trol. As long as the president rationally sacrifices low-value activities before 
high-value activities, then the marginal cost to the president of influencing 
the bureaucracy is increasing in the distance the president moves the bu-
reaucracy’s ideal point.
68 
Finally, after the president has altered the bureaucracy’s preferences, the 
bureaucracy implements its (new) ideal policy. The benefits of this policy 
choice to the president and to the voter are inversely proportional to the dis-
tance between this policy and the ideal points of the president and the voter, 
respectively.
69  
                                                                                                                      
the president faces increasing marginal control costs, because greater bureaucratic resistance likely 
translates into higher presidential control costs. 
  68.  The only case in which this would not be true is the unrealistic special case in which the 
president places an equal value on all possible alternative uses of her resources. 
  69.  In the formal analysis, the final policy, x1, is equal to b1, and each player’s final utility 
payoff from the policy outcome is equal to the negative square of the distance between the player’s 
ideal point (v1 or p1) and the final outcome (x1). See infra Section A of the Appendix. 
The assumption that political actors have concave utility functions is standard in the political 
science literature; the assumption that this function is quadratic is a conventional simplification 
typically justified on grounds of mathematical convenience. See James M. Enelow & Melvin J. 
Hinich, The Spatial Theory of Voting 81–82, 165 (1984). Some have questioned, however, 
whether the concavity assumption makes sense when the relevant “good” is a policy outcome. See 
Elhauge, supra note 17, at 349 n.79. 
In the context of regulatory policy, one might defend the concavity assumption on the follow-
ing grounds: A political actor’s ideal regulatory policy (e.g., the ideal stringency of a safety 
standard) is determined by the point at which the regulation’s marginal benefit equals its marginal 
cost. Even if one assumes that the regulation’s marginal benefits are constant (each life saved counts 
just as much, no matter the total number of lives saved), the regulation’s marginal cost is likely to be 
increasing, because social resources devoted to increased safety will tend to be diverted from low-
value uses before they are diverted from high-value uses. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68. 
For this reason, an actor’s net cost from policies that deviate from her ideal point will increase—at 
an increasing rate—as the size of the deviation gets larger. This implies a concave utility function. 
To illustrate, suppose that the regulatory benefit is defined in terms of number of statistical 
lives saved and the regulatory cost is the opportunity cost of lost economic productivity. Suppose 
that, for a given actor, the benefit of the regulation, in units of utility, is equal to 10 × (number of 
lives saved), while the cost is equal to (number of lives saved)
2. This means the marginal benefit is 
constant at 10, while the marginal cost is equal to 2 × (number of lives saved). The actor’s ideal 
regulatory policy is one that saves five lives, because at this point the marginal cost equals the mar-
ginal benefit (both are equal to 10); at this point, the actor’s net utility is 25 (50−25). If the 
regulation were more stringent, so that it saves six lives—one more than the actor’s ideal policy—
the actor would receive a final utility of 24 (60−36). If the regulation were still more stringent, so 
that it saves seven lives, the actor’s final utility would be 21 (70−49). The results are symmetric for 
deviations below rather than above the actor’s ideal level of regulatory stringency: If the regulation 
saves four lives, her utility is 24 (40−16); if it saves three lives, her utility is 21 (30−9). Thus a de-
viation of two “units” (statistical lives saved) from the actor’s ideal point is more than twice as bad, 
in utility terms, as a deviation of one unit. This is consistent with the concavity assumption. 
That said, there may be regulatory policy issues where the concavity assumption is more diffi-
cult to justify, especially when neither the regulatory benefits nor the costs can be readily conceived 
as the opportunity cost of diverting social resources from some other use. The analysis presented in 
this Article should be treated with caution in such contexts. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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B. The Baseline Analysis 
We can now address this Article’s central question: What is the optimal 
level of bureaucratic insulation from political control? Section II.B.1 con-
siders what the answer to this question would be at the policymaking stage, 
when the ideal points of the president, the bureaucracy, and the voter are all 
known. The more interesting and important case, however, is when the level 
of bureaucratic insulation must be established at the institutional design 
stage. Section II.B.2 analyzes this case and demonstrates that the optimal 
level of bureaucratic insulation is always positive, except in the unrealistic 
special case where the president is perfectly responsive to voter preferences. 
This result contrasts with the widely held view that if majoritarianism is the 
only relevant normative consideration, the politically responsive president 
should have unfettered control of the administration. As a comparative mat-
ter, however, the results of the analysis in Section II.B.2 are consistent with 
intuitive hypotheses about the relationship between optimal bureaucratic 
insulation and other political-institutional variables: The optimal level of 
bureaucratic insulation is negatively correlated with expected presidential 
responsiveness, initial bureaucratic bias, and voter preference instability. 
1. Optimal Bureaucratic Insulation at the Policymaking Stage 
Consider first the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation at the policy-
making stage, when the ideal points of the voter, president, and bureaucracy 
are all known with certainty.
70 For expositional convenience, assume that 
before the president exerts any influence, the bureaucracy’s ideal point is 
located to the right of the voter’s ideal point.
71 There are three cases to con-
sider, each of which is depicted in Figure 1. 
                                                                                                                      
  70.  The formal analysis of this case is presented in Section B.2 of the Appendix. 
  71.  The analysis in this Section would be the same in all substantive respects if the bureauc-
racy’s ideal point were located to the voter’s left. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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Figure 1 
Possible Alignments of President, Bureaucracy, 
and Voter at the Policymaking Stage 
V
V
V
B
B
B P
P
P
Case 1: President (P) is to the right of the bureaucracy (B)—Voter (V) prefers fully insulated bureaucracy
Case 2: President (P) is between voter (V) and bureaucracy (B)—Voter prefers full presidential control
Case 3: President (P) is to the left of the voter—Voter prefers partially insulated bureaucracy
 
 
First, if the president is even further to the right of the voter than the bu-
reaucracy (Case 1 in Figure 1), the voter prefers the bureaucracy to be 
completely insulated from presidential control. In this case, if the president 
had any influence over the bureaucracy, she would use it to move the bu-
reaucracy even further to the right, away from the voter’s ideal point. 
Second, if the president is in between the voter and the bureaucracy 
(Case 2 in Figure 1), the voter prefers the president to have total control over 
bureaucratic policy. Any leftward move by the bureaucracy in the direction 
of the president’s ideal point is a gain for the voter, so the voter would like 
to give the president the power to move the bureaucracy as much as the 
president would like. 
Finally, if the bureaucracy is to the voter’s right and the president is to 
the voter’s left (Case 3 in Figure 1), the voter prefers an intermediate level 
of bureaucratic insulation. More precisely, the voter prefers a level of bu-
reaucratic insulation such that, when the president balances the costs and 
benefits of shifting the bureaucracy’s ideal point to the left, the president 
pulls the bureaucracy just to the voter’s ideal point and then stops. If bu-
reaucratic insulation were weaker than this optimal intermediate level, the 
president would pull the bureaucracy even farther to the left, past the voter’s 
ideal point. If bureaucratic insulation were stronger, the president would 
shift the bureaucracy’s ideal point by a smaller amount, leaving the bureauc-
racy to the voter’s right. If the level of bureaucratic insulation is just right, 
however, the voter will end up with her ideal policy. 
Although this analysis is straightforward, it has notable substantive im-
plications. The voter prefers maximum presidential control only in the 
limited set of cases where the president’s ideal point happens to lie between 
the voter and the bureaucracy (Case 2 in Figure 1). Otherwise the voter pre-
fers at least some degree of bureaucratic insulation. In other words, if we 
use “liberal” and “conservative” to denote positions relative to the voter STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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rather than on some absolute scale, the voter only prefers maximum presi-
dential control when a conservative president wants to move a conservative 
bureaucracy in a liberal direction, or when a liberal president wants to move 
a liberal bureaucracy in a conservative direction. We should therefore expect 
the greatest voter support for presidential authority when the president is 
acting, in a loose sense, against ideological type.
72 
2. Optimal Bureaucratic Insulation at the Institutional Design Stage  
The preceding discussion of optimal bureaucratic insulation at the poli-
cymaking stage is helpful for building intuition, but the more interesting 
question concerns the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation at the institu-
tional design stage.
73 How much control would the voter like to give the 
president over the bureaucracy if the voter must make this choice before she 
knows for certain what her own preferences, or those of the president, will 
be in the policymaking stage? 
Recall that the expected value of the president’s ideal point is always 
equal to the voter’s ideal point. Sometimes the president may be to the vot-
er’s left, and sometimes the president may be to the voter’s right, but 
political accountability mechanisms ensure that on average the president’s 
ideal point will equal the voter’s. The expected value of the bureaucracy’s 
ideal point, however, may be systematically biased away from the voter. 
And, in contrast to the president, the bureaucracy’s preferences are unaf-
fected by shifts in voter preferences. For these reasons, it is tempting to 
conclude—along with many strong presidentialists—that at the institutional 
design stage, the voter is always better off with minimum bureaucratic insu-
lation and maximum presidential control. 
That conclusion, however, is fundamentally incorrect. It rests on the fal-
lacious belief that the expected value of the distance between two variables 
is equal to the distance between the expected values of those two variables. 
But this is not the case. To illustrate the point with a fanciful example, imag-
ine an archery competition in which each competitor wants to come as close 
as possible to the bull’s-eye. One contestant’s shots are “unbiased” but inac-
curate: half the time he misses by ten inches to the left, and half the time he 
misses by ten inches to the right. The second contestant’s shots are “biased” 
but more accurate: her shots always land exactly two inches to the right of 
the bull’s-eye. The expected location of the first archer’s shot is the bull’s-
eye, while the expected location of the second archer’s shot is two inches to 
the right. But what we care about is the expected distance between the shot 
and the bull’s-eye, not the distance between the expected location of the shot 
and the bull’s-eye. For the first archer, this expected distance is ten inches; 
                                                                                                                      
  72.  This formulation is potentially misleading; the president always wants to move the bu-
reaucracy toward her own ideal point. That said, when we observe an administration to the right of 
the median voter attempting to shift policy in a leftward direction, or vice versa, we should expect 
these to be precisely the cases in which voters are most sympathetic to broad claims of presidential 
authority. 
  73.  The formal analysis of this case is presented in Section B.3 of the Appendix. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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for the second archer, it is two inches. In this example, and in the context of 
bureaucratic policymaking, errors to one side or the other do not “cancel 
each other out.” 
Even though bureaucratic insulation may bias the expected bureaucratic 
policy outcome away from the voter’s ideal point, bureaucratic insulation 
may also reduce the variance in policy outcomes. Higher levels of bureau-
cratic insulation always shift the policy outcome from the president’s ideal 
point toward the bureaucracy’s original ideal point. The absolute magnitude 
of the shift, moreover, is greater for presidents whose policy views diverge 
substantially from those of the bureaucracy than it is for presidents with 
preferences relatively close to those of the bureaucracy. The reason is that 
increases in bureaucratic insulation increase the president’s marginal control 
costs by a constant proportion. Because the president’s marginal control 
costs are an increasing function of the distance the president shifts the bu-
reaucracy’s policy preferences, an increase in bureaucratic insulation causes 
a greater absolute increase in marginal control costs for large shifts in bu-
reaucratic preferences than for small shifts.  
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2. This figure depicts a situa-
tion in which the bureaucracy’s initial ideal point is assumed to be zero. 
Imagine, for example, that the policy issue is the number of expected cancer 
deaths per year that would occur in some industry at different levels of regu-
latory stringency. The bureaucracy, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) in this example, is assumed to be very aggres-
sive: left to its own devices, it would prefer reducing the number of cancer 
deaths to zero, even if this would have very high economic costs. The figure 
then compares graphically the expected final policy outcomes under two pos-
sible presidents and two different possible levels of bureaucratic insulation. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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Figure 2 
Effect of Bureaucratic Insulation Level on 
President’s Equilibrium Influence over 
Bureaucratic Policy (OSHA Example) 
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One possible president (let us say the Republican) would prefer a more 
forgiving regulatory standard that results in two expected cancer deaths per 
year in the industry. The solid line further to the top right in Figure 2 depicts 
the Republican president’s marginal benefit from moving the final outcome 
away from OSHA’s stringent initial position in the direction of the presi-
dent’s ideal regulation. The president’s marginal benefit of moving the 
policy outcome to the right is positive for any final outcome less than two 
cancer deaths per year, but this marginal benefit is declining. Another possi-
ble president (let us say the Democrat) also views OSHA’s initial ideal 
policy as too stringent, but the Democrat would prefer a moderate level of 
regulatory stringency that results in one expected cancer death per year. The 
Democrat’s marginal benefit from changing the policy outcome, depicted by 
the solid line further to the bottom left in Figure 2, is positive but decreasing 
for any move to the right up to her ideal point; further moves to the right 
would imply a negative marginal utility (not depicted in the figure).  
The president’s marginal cost of moving OSHA’s policy to the right is 
an increasing function of the size of the policy shift, and the rate at which 
this marginal cost increases depends on the level of bureaucratic insulation.
74 
Figure 2 depicts the president’s marginal cost curve at two possible levels of 
bureaucratic insulation. The lower dashed line in the figure depicts the 
president’s marginal cost at a relatively low level of bureaucratic insulation. 
                                                                                                                      
  74.  For a discussion and justification of the assumption that marginal control costs are in-
creasing in the magnitude of the policy change, see supra text accompanying notes 66–68. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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The point at which this marginal cost curve intersects the relevant marginal 
benefit curve determines the expected policy outcomes under Republican 
and Democratic presidents at this level of bureaucratic insulation. In the 
example depicted in the figure, these outcomes are 4/3 expected deaths for 
the Republican and 2/3 expected deaths for the Democrat.  
The upper dashed line in Figure 2 represents the president’s marginal 
control cost curve when OSHA is more insulated from presidential control. 
The president’s marginal control cost under this level of bureaucratic insula-
tion is twice as high as the marginal control cost under the level of 
insulation depicted by the lower marginal cost curve. But this proportional 
increase in marginal control costs leads to a disproportionate change in the 
policy outcomes under each president. Again, each president in equilibrium 
will choose a final policy outcome that equalizes marginal benefits and mar-
ginal costs (i.e. the point where her marginal benefit and cost curves 
intersect). Under the higher level of bureaucratic insulation, this calculation 
produces a final outcome of 1/2 under the Democrat and 1 under the Repub-
lican. For both the Democrat and the Republican, the higher level of 
bureaucratic insulation shifts the final policy outcome to the left, closer to 
OSHA’s initial ideal point. But the magnitude of this shift is twice as large 
for the Republican (1/3) as for the Democrat (1/6). This specific example 
illustrates a more general phenomenon: the greater the distance between the 
president’s ideal point and the bureaucracy’s initial ideal point, the greater 
the sensitivity of the outcome to the level of bureaucratic insulation. As a 
result, increasing the level of bureaucratic insulation leads to a “compres-
sion” of the probability distribution over expected policy outcomes. 
Figure 3 provides a graphic illustration of this compression effect, under 
different assumptions about the probable location of the president’s ideal 
point. In the example depicted in Figure 3, the president’s ideal point is 
drawn from a normal distribution (a bell curve), with the mean of the distri-
bution equal to the voter’s ideal point. The dashed curve in Figure 3 depicts 
this distribution.
75 The bureaucracy, on the other hand, has an ideal point that 
is fixed some distance to the right of the voter’s ideal point.  
If the president has total control over bureaucratic policy, then the prob-
ability distribution of the final policy outcome is identical to the probability 
distribution of the president’s ideal point (the dashed curve in Figure 3). If 
the bureaucracy has complete autonomy from the president, the final policy 
outcome will simply be equal to the bureaucracy’s initial ideal point. If the 
bureaucracy is partially insulated—in the example depicted in the figure, if 
the level of bureaucratic insulation is such that the president will only move 
the bureaucracy half as far as she would if she had total control—then solid 
curve in Figure 3 depicts the probability distribution over the final outcome. 
Observe that this distribution is biased away from the voter’s ideal point: its 
expected value is halfway between the voter’s ideal point and the bureauc-
racy’s initial ideal point. But the distribution is compressed: it has a lower 
                                                                                                                      
  75.  Speaking more technically, the curve depicted by the dashed line in Figure 3 is the prob-
ability density function for the president’s ideal point. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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variance than the probability distribution over outcomes when the president 
has total control. If the level of bureaucratic insulation were higher, the prob-
ability distribution of policy outcomes would be centered further to the right 
and more compressed; if the level of bureaucratic insulation were lower, this 
distribution would be centered further to the left and less compressed. 
Figure 3 
Outcome “Compression” Caused by 
Bureaucratic Insulation 
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This compression effect means that the expected divergence between the 
voter’s ideal point and the policy outcome may be lower with a positive lev-
el of bureaucratic insulation than with absolute presidential control. To 
illustrate, consider another example. Imagine that an administrative agen-
cy—say, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)—must set an 
ambient air quality standard, expressed as a maximum allowable concentra-
tion level for some pollutant. Setting this standard requires making a 
difficult trade-off between public health and economic growth. Suppose that 
the median voter, if fully informed, would prefer a maximum allowable 
concentration for this pollutant of 0.10 parts per million (ppm). For simplic-
ity, assume that the voter wants to minimize the divergence between the 
policy outcome and her ideal policy, and assume that she treats deviations 
above and below her most preferred standard as equally bad. 
The EPA prefers a much more aggressive policy: absent external politi-
cal influence, the EPA would set a maximum allowable concentration of 
0.02 ppm. The president is responsive to the median voter’s preferences in 
expectation, but not perfectly so. Let us assume that the president will strive 
for a maximum concentration of somewhere between 0.03 and 0.l7 ppm, 
with any value in that range equally likely ex ante. Thus the expected value 
of the president’s ideal point is 0.10 ppm, exactly equal to the median STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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voter’s ideal point. The expected deviation between the president’s ideal 
point and the voter’s ideal point, however, is 0.035 ppm. If an institutional 
designer interested in maximizing responsiveness to majoritarian prefer-
ences had to choose between total bureaucratic autonomy and total 
presidential control, she would choose the latter. The divergence between 
the policy outcome and the median voter’s ideal point under complete bu-
reaucratic autonomy is 0.08 ppm—more than twice as large as the expected 
divergence of 0.035 ppm under absolute presidential control. 
But the voter might do even better if the EPA is partially insulated from 
presidential control, so that it is costly but not impossible for the president to 
influence agency policy. Suppose that, due to some combination of institu-
tional structures, legal rules, and informal norms, each president would find it 
worthwhile to shift EPA policy only a fraction of the way toward her most-
preferred policy. As discussed above, the more distant the president is from 
the EPA’s initial ideal point, the greater the absolute effect of a change in the 
level of bureaucratic insulation on the policy outcome. Thus increasing the 
level of presidential influence over the EPA simultaneously shifts the expected 
outcome away from the EPA’s initial ideal point (0.02 ppm) toward the presi-
dent’s expected ideal point (0.10 ppm) and expands the range of possible 
outcomes from certainty of the EPA’s original ideal outcome (0.02 ppm) to the 
full range of possibilities associated with different possible administrations 
(from 0.03 to 0.17). These effects are depicted graphically in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 
Expected Outcomes for Different 
Degrees of Presidential Influence (EPA Example) 
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The solid lines in Figure 4 indicate the most stringent and lenient envi-
ronmental standards that one could expect under different levels of 
bureaucratic insulation. In other words, these are the outcomes we would 
observe, for different levels of presidential influence over the bureaucracy, STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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when the president’s true ideal point is 0.03 ppm or 0.17 ppm. Because of 
the assumption that any presidential ideal point in this range is equally 
likely, the expected outcome under different levels of bureaucratic insulation 
(depicted by the dashed line in Figure 4) is simply the average of the most 
extreme possible outcomes. As the level of presidential influence increases 
(that is, as the level of bureaucratic insulation decreases), the expected out-
come shifts from the EPA’s initial ideal point (0.02 ppm) to the voter’s ideal 
point (0.10 ppm), but the variance of the possible outcomes (that is, the gap 
between the most stringent possible outcome and the most lenient possible 
outcome) also increases. 
Because the voter cares about the expected divergence between the ac-
tual outcome and her ideal point, the voter may prefer a moderate level of 
bureaucratic insulation. In the above example, suppose that the EPA is suffi-
ciently insulated that the president would only shift the EPA three-quarters 
of the way toward her ideal policy. In this case, the distribution of possible 
policy outcomes will be between 0.0275 ppm and 0.1325 ppm, with any 
value in that range equally likely. The expected outcome is in that case is 
approximately 0.08 ppm—too low from the median voter’s perspective. But 
the expected divergence between the outcome and the voter’s ideal point in 
this case is just slightly above 0.03 ppm. This expected divergence is about 
14% lower than the expected divergence under absolute presidential control 
(0.035 ppm).
76 Thus making bureaucratic control somewhat difficult for the 
president better serves majoritarian values than giving the president absolute 
control—even though the president’s policy preferences reflect the voter’s 
preferences in expectation, and even though the bureaucracy is biased and 
not directly responsive to voter preferences.
77 The degree of expected policy 
responsiveness to voter preferences under different levels of presidential 
influence is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.  
                                                                                                                      
  76.  The example in the text does not correspond exactly to the median voter’s optimal level 
of bureaucratic insulation. The expected divergence between the outcome and the voter’s ideal point 
is even lower when the president moves EPA policy approximately 75.257% of the way toward the 
president’s ideal point. Also, if the voter views the marginal cost of policy divergence as increasing 
in the size of the divergence (the assumption made in the formal analysis), optimal bureaucratic 
insulation will be higher. The discussion in the text neglects these complications in order to illustrate 
the basic intuition with a relatively simple example. 
  77.  Importantly, this result does not depend on the assumption that the voter is risk averse, 
though risk aversion might supply a separate reason why a voter might prefer a more biased ex-
pected policy outcome with lower variance to a less biased policy outcome with higher variance. 
Even a risk-neutral voter treats the variance of policy outcomes as a cost because higher variance 
implies a higher expected distance between the policy ultimately chosen and the voter’s ideal point. 
Indeed the textual examples do not assume risk-averse voters (though the formal analysis in the 
Appendix does). The only situation in which the basic result does not hold with a risk-neutral voter 
is when there is zero probability that the actual outcome will fall on the opposite side of the voter’s 
ideal point as the expected outcome. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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Figure 5 
Expected Policy Responsiveness and 
Presidential Influence (EPA Example) 
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We can illustrate the same general point using another example, with 
somewhat different assumptions about expected presidential preferences. 
Suppose that the DOJ must decide how much of its enforcement budget to 
devote to immigration cases. Suppose further that the median voter, if fully 
informed, would prefer that the DOJ allocate 3% of its budget to this task. 
The career staff at the DOJ, however, cares less about immigration than does 
the median voter: left on its own, the DOJ would allocate only 2% of its 
budget to immigration enforcement. Now suppose that the president is re-
sponsive to voter preferences in expectation but ideological differences 
cause the priorities of the different parties to skew in different directions. A 
Democratic president would prefer to allocate only 1% of the DOJ budget to 
immigration cases, while a Republican president’s preferred allocation 
would be 5%. Finally, assume that the probability that each party wins the 
presidency is 50%. Figure 6 charts the outcomes under different levels of 
presidential control over DOJ enforcement priorities, with the actual out-
comes under Republican and Democratic presidents given by the upper and 
lower solid lines, respectively, and the ex ante expected outcome given by 
the dashed line. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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Figure 6 
Expected Outcomes for Different Degrees 
of Presidential Influence (DOJ Example) 
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Under these assumptions, if the median voter had to choose between ab-
solute bureaucratic autonomy and absolute presidential control, she would 
actually prefer the former. Even though the expected value of the president’s 
ideal point is equal to the voter’s, the expected divergence between the vot-
er’s ideal policy and the actual outcome is smaller under absolute agency 
independence (one percentage point rather than two percentage points). The 
median voter would be even better off, however, if she could give the presi-
dent some influence over DOJ enforcement priorities but make the exercise 
of this influence sufficiently costly that the president would not shift DOJ 
policy as far as she would otherwise prefer. In particular, suppose that a 
moderate level of bureaucratic insulation means that the president will only 
shift DOJ policy one-third as far as she would like. If so, then under a Re-
publican president the DOJ will end up allocating 3% of its budget to 
immigration cases—exactly what the median voter prefers—while under a 
Democratic president, the allocation will be approximately 1.67%, which 
the median voter views as too low by approximately 1.33%. Because the ex 
ante probability that each party wins the presidency is 50%, the expected 
divergence between the median voter’s preferred allocation and the actual 
outcome is approximately 0.67%. This is better than the 1% divergence the 
voter could expect from a completely independent DOJ and much better 
than the 2% divergence the voter could expect from absolute presidential 
control of DOJ enforcement priorities. Figure 7 illustrates this result. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
82  Michigan Law Review  [Vol. 107:53 
 
Figure 7 
Expected Policy Responsiveness and  
Presidential Influence (DOJ Example) 
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These examples are highly stylized, but they illustrate a general theoreti-
cal finding with great practical significance: majoritarian interests are often 
best served not by maximizing the influence of an electorally accountable 
politician but rather by ensuring a degree of bureaucratic insulation that 
makes political control of agencies costly but not impossible. Some positive 
level of bureaucratic insulation will maximize expected policy responsive-
ness because bureaucratic insulation creates a kind of compensatory inertia 
that reduces the impact of random deviations in presidential preferences 
from the median voter’s ideal point, thereby reducing the expected variance 
in policy outcomes. Up to a point, the benefits of this variance reduction 
will outweigh the costs.
78 
As one might expect, the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation is 
smaller when expected presidential responsiveness to voter preferences is 
greater and when initial bureaucratic bias is larger. Optimal bureaucratic 
insulation is also smaller when voter preferences are unstable. This is be-
cause instability in voter preferences increases the expected distance 
between the voter’s ideal point and the bureaucracy’s ideal point, but does 
not affect the expected ideological distance between the voter and the presi-
dent.
79 Furthermore, this analysis can be extended to consider another of the 
supposed benefits of strong presidentialism: the president’s allegedly greater 
                                                                                                                      
  78.  These results are related to Neal Katyal’s advocacy of an “internal separation of powers” 
within the executive branch, including mechanisms that give agencies more autonomy from direct 
political control. See Katyal, supra note 9. Katyal, however, bases his arguments for bureaucratic 
autonomy primarily on his claims that such autonomy improves the quality of information and that 
bureaucrats may take a longer-term view of the national interests. This Article shows that some 
degree of bureaucratic insulation is desirable for a majority of voters even if bureaucratic insulation 
confers no informational benefits and even if bureaucrats do not seek to maximize long-term na-
tional welfare. 
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capacity to respond swiftly to changed conditions, emergent problems, or 
new information.
80 This consideration is functionally identical to shifts in 
voter preferences. While the language of “shifting preferences” implies 
changes in underlying values, the concept could apply just as easily to 
changing circumstances that call for different policies. Hence the analysis 
supports the idea that greater presidential control is desirable when voter 
welfare may require swift policy changes, but it rejects the claim that in un-
certain policy environments the (responsive) president should have total 
control over the (otherwise unresponsive) bureaucracy. In sum, while strong 
mechanisms of presidential accountability, entrenched bureaucratic bias, and 
rapidly shifting voter preferences or interests all favor shifting relatively 
more power to the president, it does not follow that these factors favor maxi-
mum presidential control, even if the only normative objective is pleasing a 
majority of the electorate. 
Advocates of strong political control might respond, however, that the 
median voter’s optimal level of bureaucratic insulation, though positive, is 
likely to be trivially small. If the degree of expected presidential responsive-
ness to voter preferences is very strong, the bureaucracy’s expected bias is 
severe, or voter preferences are very unstable, then the optimal level of bu-
reaucratic insulation might be low enough that it can be treated as if it were 
zero, at least for purposes of designing legal doctrines and political institu-
tions. While rigorous empirical testing is beyond the scope of this Article, 
existing data provide little support for this objection. First, quantitative re-
search shows a consistent and sizable divergence between the views of the 
median voter in the national electorate and the positions of political parties 
and presidential administrations. The Republican Party and Republican 
presidents are notably more conservative than the median voter, while the 
Democratic Party and Democratic presidents are notably more liberal—
though presidents of both parties show responsiveness to changes in voter 
preferences.
81 This unsurprising finding undermines the notion that the ex-
pected distance between the president’s agenda and the median voter’s ideal 
point is so small that it can be ignored.
82 Furthermore, while reliable data on 
                                                                                                                      
 80.  See Kagan, supra note 22, at 2341–46; Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and 
the D.C. Circuit, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 693, 702 (2005). 
 81.  See Robert S. Erikson et al., The Macro Polity 256–69, 309–11 (2002); Morris P. 
Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America 16–21 (2d ed. 2006); Joseph   
Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Preference Aggregation, Representation, and Elected American 
Political Institutions (Dec. 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
www.dartmouth.edu/~herron/RepInstitutions.pdf;  cf. Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference 
Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 
433 (2007) (finding substantial divergence in the policy preferences of presidents from different 
parties, as well as substantial divergence between the ideal point of presidents and median legisla-
tors); Michael Bailey & Kelly H. Chang, Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: 
Interinstitutional Preference Estimation, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 477 (2001) (reaching similar conclu-
sions); Charles R. Shipan & William R. Lowry, Environmental Policy and Party Divergence in 
Congress, 54 Pol. Res. Q. 245 (2001) (finding that Republicans and Democrats take substantially 
different positions on environmental policy issues). 
  82.  The finding that the positions of elected politicians systematically diverge from the me-
dian voter’s ideal point, though inconsistent with the simplest spatial models of electoral STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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bureaucratic bias are scarce, the existing evidence does not support the 
claim that bureaucratic bias is so extreme that the president’s expected di-
vergence from median voter preferences is trivial by comparison.
83 As for 
voter preference instability, survey research suggests that although voter 
preferences vary over time, they do not tend to change radically from year to 
year or election to election.
84  
While none of this is conclusive, these data are broadly consistent with 
commonsense impressions of U.S. politics: the expected policy agendas of 
Republican and Democratic presidents diverge from the median voter by 
nontrivial amounts; agencies, while not directly responsive to the electorate, 
are not radically out of line with majoritarian preferences; and changes in 
voter policy preferences are relatively gradual. These observations under-
mine the claim that the median voter’s optimal level of bureaucratic 
insulation is likely to be so small that it is sensible to treat it as zero for 
practical purposes. Indeed, if presidents and political parties are relatively 
polarized, bureaucracies are relatively moderate, and voter preference 
change is gradual—as some evidence seems to suggest—then the analysis 
developed in this Article suggests that the optimal degree of bureaucratic 
insulation from political control may be substantial. 
C. Extensions 
The analysis in Section II.B.2 establishes a simple hypothesis: the ex-
pected responsiveness of bureaucratic policy to voter preferences is 
maximized when the unaccountable bureaucracy is partially insulated from 
the politically responsive president. The optimal level of bureaucratic insula-
tion is a decreasing function of expected presidential responsiveness, initial 
bureaucratic bias, and the instability of voter preferences. Nonetheless the 
                                                                                                                      
competition, is consistent with more sophisticated models that incorporate factors like incomplete 
information, differential voter activism, and politicians’ personal policy goals. See Peter H. Aranson 
& Peter C. Ordeshook, Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections, in Probability Models of 
Collective Decision Making 298 (Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg eds., 1972); Randall 
L. Calvert, Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, 
and Convergence, 29 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 69 (1985); Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for 
the Power of Special Interests, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 809 (1998); Rebecca B. Morton, Incomplete 
Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 382 
(1993). 
 83.  See Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and 
Agency Preferences, 16 Pol. Analysis 3 (2008) (using expert opinion surveys to assess long-term 
agency ideological leanings and finding that although some agencies consistently slant liberal or con-
servative, most appear relatively moderate); David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee 
Ideology, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 438 (2004) (finding that the confirmation process tends to result in 
agency heads who are more moderate than the appointing president); see also Dan Ho, Measuring 
Agency Preferences: Expert Surveys, Agency Voting, and the Influence of the Chair (Aug. 16, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://dho.stanford.edu/research/fccsurvp.pdf (discussing em-
pirical techniques for estimating the ideal points of agency officials). 
 84.  See Erikson et al., supra note 81, at 256–69; Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden 
& James M. Snyder, Jr., Issue Preferences and Measurement Error (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/material/ansolabehere_rodden_snyder.pdf. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
October 2008]  Optimal Control of the Bureaucracy 85 
 
optimal level of bureaucratic insulation is always positive, unless the presi-
dent is perfectly responsive to voter preferences. 
The analysis, however, incorporates a number of strong simplifying as-
sumptions. This Section therefore considers four extensions that address 
some of the most significant limitations of the baseline analysis. Section 
II.C.1 explores how the results change if the president’s bureaucratic control 
efforts divert the president from engaging in other activities that affect voter 
welfare. Section II.C.2 analyzes the case in which the voter can increase 
expected presidential responsiveness by engaging in costly monitoring and 
lobbying activities. Section II.C.3 considers a strategic voter who can delib-
erately bias the president’s expected ideal point. Finally, Section II.C.4 
extends the policymaking time horizon, considering both cases in which 
each president’s influence over the bureaucracy is temporary and cases in 
which each president has a more lasting influence over bureaucratic prefer-
ences. 
1. Voter Internalization of Presidential Control Costs  
The baseline analysis assumes that the voter cares about the resources 
the president devotes to bureaucratic control only because the voter cares 
about bureaucratic policy outcomes. While this assumption may often be 
reasonable, it is subject to the following criticism: Influencing an insulated 
bureaucracy requires the president to divert resources—time, attention, po-
litical capital—away from other activities, and some of these alternative 
uses of presidential resources are likely to affect voter welfare as well as 
presidential welfare. If so, the voter’s expected utility calculations should 
take into account the degree to which the president’s struggles with the bu-
reaucracy divert the president’s attention from other tasks.
85 
Incorporating this consideration requires separate analysis of three 
cases. First, it might be the case that alternative uses of presidential re-
sources confer a positive expected utility on the voter, but the voter cares 
less about control costs than the president does. This is the most plausible 
case as a substantive matter. After all, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
although political accountability mechanisms lead the president to pursue 
activities that benefit the median voter in most cases, the voter will tend to 
value the president’s alternative projects less than the president does. Sec-
ond, the voter might value alternative uses of the president’s resources more 
highly than president does. This situation could arise if the president and the 
voter share the same general objectives, but the president’s lowest priorities 
tend to be the voter’s highest priorities. Third, the voter might expect to 
benefit if the president shifts resources away from alternative projects,   
                                                                                                                      
  85.  This extension is presented formally in Section C.1 of the Appendix. The relative weight 
the voter places on presidential control costs is parameterized as λ. See infra Section C.2 of the 
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if (outside the bureaucratic policy realm) the president tends to pursue ac-
tivities that harm voter welfare.
86 
Start with the first case, in which presidential control efforts are costly to 
the voter but less costly than they are to the president. In this case, the 
voter’s optimal level of bureaucratic insulation tends to be pushed toward 
the extremes. If the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation in the baseline 
case is low, then increasing the costs to the voter of presidential control will 
drive the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation even lower. If, on the other 
hand, the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation in the baseline case is 
high, then increasing the costliness of presidential control efforts to the voter 
will push optimal bureaucratic insulation even higher.  
The explanation is as follows. When presidential effort is costly to the 
voter, the voter would prefer less total presidential effort than in the baseline 
case. Furthermore, the voter would like to reduce presidential effort costs as 
efficiently as possible. Changing the level of bureaucratic insulation has two 
effects on presidential effort costs. First, as bureaucratic insulation rises, the 
president decreases the amount she attempts to shift the bureaucracy’s ideal 
point, which reduces total effort costs. Second, as bureaucratic insulation 
rises, the marginal cost of shifting the bureaucracy’s ideal point goes up, 
which increases total effort costs. When the voter’s optimal level of bureau-
cratic insulation in the baseline case is high, the former effect predominates: 
a small change in bureaucratic insulation will lead to a relatively large 
change in the amount the president shifts the bureaucracy’s preferences. 
Thus an increase in bureaucratic insulation will lead to a net reduction in 
total control costs. In contrast, when the voter’s optimal level of bureaucratic 
insulation in the baseline case is relatively low, a large change in bureau-
cratic insulation will lead to only a small change in the amount the president 
moves the bureaucracy’s ideal point. In this case, therefore, reducing bu-
reaucratic insulation will reduce rather than increase total control costs.  
Even in this extension, the voter’s optimal level of bureaucratic insula-
tion will often remain somewhere between the extremes of total bureaucratic 
autonomy and total presidential control. It is, however, possible that one or 
the other of these extremes may be optimal if presidential effort imposes 
sufficiently high costs on the voter and the optimal level of bureaucratic in-
sulation in the baseline case is already somewhat close to one extreme or the 
other. By selecting total bureaucratic autonomy or total presidential control, 
the voter can reduce presidential effort costs to zero. When the president has 
absolute control of the bureaucracy, she can change the bureaucracy’s ideal 
point as much as she wants without bearing any costs. When the bureauc-
racy is completely independent, the president does not bother trying to 
manipulate the bureaucracy’s preferences, and so the president does not in-
cur any control costs. Thus there may be situations in which the strong 
                                                                                                                      
  86.  There is also a fourth case, in which the voter and the president place the same relative 
value on policy outcomes and control costs. As the Appendix shows, the results in this case are 
equivalent to those in the second case, where the voter places a higher relative weight on control 
costs than does the president. See infra Section C.1 of the Appendix. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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presidentialist thesis holds—but not because unconstrained presidential au-
thority maximizes the expected responsiveness of bureaucratic policy. 
Rather, the voter sometimes prefers giving the president total control of the 
bureaucracy, in spite of the fact that doing so makes bureaucratic policy out-
comes less responsive to voter preferences, because the voter prefers to free 
up the president to divert more resources to doing other things the voter ca-
res about. 
What about the second case, in which the voter cares as much or more 
about presidential control costs than does the president herself? In this un-
usual situation, the voter would prefer either complete bureaucratic 
autonomy or absolute presidential control; no intermediate level of bureau-
cratic insulation would ever be optimal. The explanation follows from the 
earlier discussion. When the voter cares at least as much about the presi-
dent’s control costs as the president does, the voter wants to reduce control 
costs to zero because expected control costs to the voter always exceed the 
expected policy benefits the voter might be able to secure from an interme-
diate level of bureaucratic insulation. Again, the voter has two ways to 
reduce control costs to zero: either let the president change the bureauc-
racy’s ideal point at no cost or make it impossible for the president to 
change the bureaucracy’s ideal point at all. The voter prefers the former if 
the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation in the baseline case is low and 
the latter if the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation in the baseline case 
is high. 
In the preceding two cases, the voter prefers that the president not be 
“tied down” or “distracted” by struggles with the bureaucracy, all else equal. 
There might, however, be cases in which the voter is better off if the presi-
dent is preoccupied trying to rein in the bureaucracy, perhaps because the 
president will be distracted from doing damage to voter interests in other 
areas. If so, the basic analysis is the same as in the preceding two cases, but 
the conclusions are reversed: A voter who benefits from high presidential 
control costs prefers a more intermediate level of bureaucratic insulation. 
This both creates strong incentives for the president to exert influence over 
the bureaucracy and makes the exercise of that influence costly.
87 
2. Voter Monitoring and Lobbying of the President  
The baseline analysis treated expected presidential responsiveness to 
voter preferences as independent of the level of bureaucratic insulation. But 
if presidential responsiveness to voter preferences is partly a function of 
how much the voter chooses to invest in monitoring and lobbying the   
                                                                                                                      
  87.  A final issue to consider is the potential relationship between expected presidential re-
sponsiveness on the bureaucratic policy issue and the degree to which presidential control efforts 
impose costs on the voter. These might be positively correlated. After all, if the institutions designed 
to promote political accountability are working well, we might expect a high degree of expected 
presidential responsiveness both on the bureaucratic policy issue and other issues to which the pres-
ident might devote her scarce resources. This possibility, considered in more detail in Section C.1 of 
the Appendix, introduces some additional complexity, but it does not change the central qualitative 
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president, this assumption becomes problematic, as voters may consciously 
increase their monitoring and lobbying activities in response to low bureau-
cratic insulation. We can address this issue in an extension that assumes the 
voter can subject the president to either a high level of scrutiny or a low 
level of scrutiny, where “scrutiny” encompasses a variety of monitoring and 
lobbying activities that increase the likelihood that the president hews 
closely to voter preferences. Furthermore, assume that high levels of scru-
tiny entail greater costs for the voter than low levels of scrutiny, because 
taking action to increase the political responsiveness of the president diverts 
voter time, energy, and resources away from other activities.
88 
Incorporating this feature into the analysis leads to the straightforward 
conclusion that bureaucratic insulation and direct voter scrutiny are partial 
substitutes. Both greater bureaucratic insulation and higher scrutiny reduce 
the variance associated with bureaucratic policy outcomes, but both are 
costly to the voter. When the level of bureaucratic insulation is low, the voter 
is more likely undertake costly actions to improve presidential accountabil-
ity. When the bureaucracy is heavily insulated, the voter is less likely to 
devote scarce resources to scrutinizing the president on the bureaucratic pol-
icy issue because the president has less influence over bureaucratic policy 
outcomes in this case. The voter’s optimal level of bureaucratic insulation 
will be sensitive to this substitution effect. In some cases, the voter prefers a 
lower level of bureaucratic insulation coupled with stringent scrutiny of the 
president; in other cases the voter prefers greater bureaucratic insulation and 
less direct monitoring and lobbying activity.  
The fact that bureaucratic insulation weakens voter incentives to engage 
in activities that promote political responsiveness may seem like an argu-
ment against bureaucratic insulation, but this is not necessarily the case if 
the goal is maximizing voter welfare. Bureaucratic insulation is valuable to 
the voter precisely because it enables her to shift resources from political 
monitoring and lobbying to other activities that she values. This observation 
complicates the claim that greater political control over the bureaucracy is 
good because it enhances the ability of voters to take action to increase the 
accountability of elected officials for regulatory decisions.
89 It is true that 
greater control by elected officials will increase the incentives of voters to 
monitor these officials and will generally lead to policy outcomes that track 
the voter’s preferences more closely. But from the perspective of voter wel-
fare, these gains may be illusory. The voter might do better by giving the 
unaccountable bureaucracy somewhat more autonomy and redeploying re-
sources the voter would otherwise have devoted to monitoring and lobbying 
the president. 
                                                                                                                      
  88.  This extension is presented formally in Section C.2 of the Appendix. The efficacy of 
direct monitoring is formalized as the difference between the variance of the president’s ideal point 
under low scrutiny (σL
2) and high scrutiny (σH
2). The cost to the voter of high scrutiny is parameter-
ized as κ. See infra Section C.2 of the Appendix. 
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3. Strategic Voter Selection of a Biased President  
The baseline analysis assumed a particular, and perhaps peculiar, type of 
presidential responsiveness to voter preferences. In the baseline case, the 
president’s ideal point might diverge some distance to the left or to the right 
of the voter’s ideal point, but expected presidential responsiveness is none-
theless unbiased: the expected value of the president’s ideal point is equal to 
the voter’s ideal point. The assumption that expected presidential respon-
siveness is unbiased suggests that the voter is naïve (or, more charitably, 
sincere) in that she strives simply to select a president who shares her policy 
preferences. A sophisticated voter, however, might recognize the possibility 
that she could be better off with a biased president. The degree to which real 
voters are capable of this sort of strategic thinking is, of course, an open 
question, the answer to which is likely to depend on context. That said, it is 
important to explore how the results change under alternative assumptions 
about voter behavior. 
This extension drops the assumption of a naïve voter. It assumes instead 
a sophisticated voter who tries to select a president with the optimal level of 
bias.
90 This modification yields three related results. First, a rational voter 
can always neutralize the expected costs of bureaucratic bias by biasing the 
president’s expected ideal point in the opposite direction. Second, the 
voter’s optimal level of presidential bias is greater when the bureaucracy is 
more insulated from presidential control. Third, and most importantly, when 
the voter can strategically manipulate the expected presidential bias, the 
optimal level of bureaucratic insulation is very high. Indeed, if no other con-
siderations are involved, a strategic voter would prefer the highest 
achievable level of bureaucratic insulation that still allows for the possibility 
of some presidential influence. 
To see the reason for this third result, recall that the main cost of bureau-
cratic autonomy derives from the bureaucracy’s initial bias and its lack of 
responsiveness to changing voter preferences, while the main cost of presi-
dential control derives from the variance in the president’s ideal point. When 
the voter can strategically manipulate the president’s expected bias, she can 
neutralize the costs of bureaucratic autonomy by selecting a biased presi-
dent. If the bureaucracy is too far to the left, the voter can try to select a 
president farther to the right, and vice versa. Absent any constraints on the 
voter’s ability to select the president’s expected bias, it does not matter how 
insulated the bureaucracy is from presidential control as long as some presi-
dential influence is possible. The more insulated the bureaucracy, the more the 
voter will bias the president, but the end result is the same: the voter can en-
sure that the expected bureaucratic policy choice is equal to the voter’s ideal 
point. Given this fact, the voter’s only concern is with minimizing outcome 
variance. Because there is variance associated with the president’s ideal point, 
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but not the bureaucracy’s, the voter would like to minimize the president’s 
influence over policy (without eliminating this influence entirely). 
An illustration may help clarify the result. Imagine that the EPA is re-
sponsible for setting an ambient air quality standard for some pollutant. 
Suppose further that the median voter prefers a limit of 0.10 ppm, and the 
EPA prefers a limit of 0.06 ppm. Political accountability mechanisms work 
reasonably well, but they are not perfect. The voter can try to select the ideal 
point of the president, but the president’s actual ideal pollution standard may 
vary by up to 0.04 ppm in either direction, and any value in that range is 
equally likely. If the president’s ideal point were centered on the median 
voter’s ideal point (0.10 ppm), the set of possible presidential ideal points 
would range from 0.06 ppm to 0.14 ppm. In this case the voter would be 
best off insulating the bureaucracy such that the president moves the EPA’s 
policy only half as much as the president would like, giving the voter an 
expected divergence of approximately 0.02 ppm. 
But suppose a strategic voter tries to elect a biased president. Suppose, 
for example, that the voter attempts to elect a president who prefers an ex-
tremely lax pollution standard—say 10 ppm, 100 times higher than the 
median voter’s ideal standard. The president’s actual ideal point would then 
be somewhere between 9.96 ppm and 10.04 ppm, with any value in that 
range equally likely. Suppose further that the EPA is heavily insulated from 
presidential influence, such that the president will only move EPA policy 
about 0.42% as far as the president would like. Under these conditions, the 
expected outcome will be somewhere between approximately 0.098 ppm 
and 0.102 ppm, with any outcome in this range equally likely. The expected 
divergence between the policy outcome and the voter’s ideal point is only 
about 0.001 ppm. The voter could do even better if the agency were even 
more insulated and the president were even more biased. 
Taken literally, this result seems to have absurd implications. It suggests, 
for example, that if a majority of the electorate thought the EPA was slightly 
too stringent in protecting the environment, the voters would prefer the fol-
lowing strategy: make it extraordinarily difficult for the president to 
influence EPA policy, and elect a radical anti-environmentalist president. 
This sort of implausible prediction arises, however, only because the analy-
sis has not incorporated other costs to the voter of increasing expected 
presidential bias. Such bias may lead to undesirable outcomes on other is-
sues, and it might also decrease expected presidential responsiveness. 
Furthermore, if the voter internalizes some of the president’s control costs, 
then a system in which a radical president devotes massive resources to in-
fluencing an insulated bureaucracy would impose substantial costs on the 
voter. These considerations mean that even a strategic voter would not want 
to combine extreme bureaucratic insulation with extreme presidential bias. 
That said, the basic qualitative result holds even under more realistic as-
sumptions: if the voter selects the president strategically, rather than naïvely 
trying to select a president with similar preferences, then the optimal level 
of bureaucratic insulation is higher than in the baseline case. STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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4. Extended Policy Time Horizon  
The baseline analysis considered only a single policymaking stage. In 
the real world, however, bureaucratic policy issues can persist for years or 
decades. While there are a variety of different ways one might think about 
long-term bureaucratic policy issues, this Section considers a simple exten-
sion in which there are two policymaking stages rather than one. At the 
beginning of the second policymaking stage, voter preferences may shift 
again; the size of the shift depends on voter preference instability. Next, the 
voter selects a new president. As in the baseline case, the president is re-
sponsive to voter preferences, but not perfectly so—although the expected 
value of the second president’s ideal point is equal to the voter’s new ideal 
point, the new president may deviate by some amount to the right or left. 
The president then exerts influence over the bureaucracy, and the bureauc-
racy selects a policy outcome. The level of bureaucratic insulation selected 
in the institutional design stage persists in both policymaking stages, and the 
voter wants to maximize the sum of her expected utilities at each stage.
91 
The implications of adding this second policymaking stage depend cru-
cially on whether the president’s influence over the bureaucracy’s ideal 
point is temporary or lasting. When presidential influence is temporary, a 
sitting president can shift the bureaucracy’s ideal point—but once the presi-
dent leaves office, the bureaucracy’s ideal point reverts to its initial value. 
When presidential influence is lasting, each new president takes the bu-
reaucracy as the preceding president left it.
92 In the real world, presidential 
                                                                                                                      
  91.  This extension is presented formally in Section C.4 of the Appendix. The second policy-
making stage is denoted as period t=2. The voter’s period 2 ideal point is v2=v1+ε2, where ε2 is an 
independent draw from a distribution with mean 0 and variance ρ2. The president’s period 2 ideal 
point is p2=v2+α2, where α2 is an independent draw from a distribution with mean 0 and variance σ
2. 
See infra Section C.4 of the Appendix. 
The assumption that the voter’s total utility is the sum of her utility in each stage implies that, 
from the voter’s perspective, policy excesses in one direction would not be offset by equivalent 
excesses in the opposite direction in subsequent stages (either naturally or through some sort of 
compensatory action by the voter). This assumption might be problematic in some cases. For in-
stance, if the policy dimension is the aggressiveness of law enforcement activity, then perhaps the 
voter might care only about the average long-term deterrent effect and the long-term average en-
forcement cost, but the voter might not care about short-term fluctuations in the level of 
aggressiveness. If the voter cares only about the average policy outcome over time then the voter 
would prefer maximum presidential control. This criticism, however, undermines this Article’s main 
findings only in the extreme case in which the voter cares solely about the over-time average policy 
position. As long as the voter cares at least somewhat about the within-period policy outcome, then 
the voter is willing to accept some level of policy bias in order to reduce outcome variance. The 
extreme assumption that voters care only about the long-term average policy outcome appears sub-
stantively implausible in most cases. That said, this critique suggests another comparative 
hypothesis. The more the voter cares about within-period outcomes, relative to the average overall 
outcome, the higher the voter’s optimal level of insulation. Therefore, in policy domains where the 
long-term average policy outcome is relatively more important to voters’ utility, the optimal level of 
bureaucratic insulation will be lower, all else equal; in domains where voter utility turns more on the 
currently prevailing policy, optimal bureaucratic insulation will tend to be higher. 
 92.  Cf. Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a 
New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557 (2003) (describing and assessing the phenomenon of 
“agency burrowing,” in which presidents take actions late in their terms designed to have lasting 
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influence likely has a mix of temporary and lasting effects; for simplicity, 
the analysis here will treat the cases of temporary and lasting influence as 
separate ideal types. 
In the temporary influence case, optimal bureaucratic insulation is al-
ways lower than in the baseline case, and the degree of difference is 
proportional to voter preference instability. Because voter preferences con-
tinue to drift in the second policymaking stage, the expected distance 
between the voter’s ideal point and the bureaucracy’s ideal point is higher in 
the second policymaking stage than in the first. In contrast, because the 
president’s expected ideal point shifts with the voter’s, the expected distance 
between the president and the voter is constant across both stages. When 
bureaucratic insulation is set at the optimal level, the bureaucracy will be too 
insulated in the first stage and not insulated enough in the second stage, but 
the expected sum of the voter’s payoffs across both stages will be maxi-
mized. Therefore, when there is a second policymaking stage and 
presidential influence is temporary, the voter prefers to give the president 
more influence over bureaucratic policy than in the baseline case. 
In the lasting influence case, the results are quite different. In some 
situations, the addition of the second policymaking stage decreases the op-
timal level of bureaucratic insulation, as in the temporary influence case. In 
other situations, however, optimal bureaucratic insulation is higher in the 
lasting influence case than in the baseline case. This latter situation occurs 
when expected presidential responsiveness is strong relative to initial bu-
reaucratic bias, or when voter preferences are sufficiently stable. 
To see the reason for this, recall that after the end of the first policymak-
ing stage, the bureaucracy’s new ideal point is a weighted average of the 
bureaucracy’s initial ideal point and the first president’s ideal point. The 
respective weights are determined by the level of bureaucratic insulation. 
Because the second policymaking stage replicates the decision process, the 
bureaucracy’s ideal point at the end of the second policymaking stage is a 
weighted average of the second president’s ideal point and the bureaucracy’s 
ideal point at the end of the first policymaking stage. Therefore the bureauc-
racy’s ideal point at the end of the second policymaking stage is really a 
weighted average of three things: the bureaucracy’s initial ideal point, the 
first president’s ideal point, and the second president’s ideal point. Putting 
weight on the first president’s ideal point increases the variance of policy 
outcomes at the first stage, but it reduces the variance of policy outcomes in 
the second stage. This is the same type of benefit that the voter derives from 
putting weight on the bureaucracy’s initial ideal point. Putting weight on the 
first president’s ideal point, however, has lower expected costs to the voter 
than putting weight on the bureaucracy’s initial ideal point, because the first 
president’s ideal point is likely to be closer to the voter’s ideal point in the 
second stage. Another way to think about this is that the bureaucracy “inher-
its” some of the first president’s preferences, and an average of the ideal 
points of the first and second presidents is likely to be closer to the voter’s 
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Bureaucratic insulation therefore entails a tricky trade-off for the voter. 
Greater insulation means the first president exerts less influence over the 
bureaucracy, but this influence will be more lasting because it will be harder 
for the second president to undo. On the other hand, low bureaucratic insula-
tion makes it easy for the first president to shift bureaucratic preferences 
toward her own ideal point, but it also makes it easy for the second president 
to shift the bureaucracy in different direction. When expected presidential 
responsiveness is strong relative to initial bureaucratic bias, or when voter 
preferences are sufficiently stable, the net effect of these considerations fa-
vors a higher level of bureaucratic insulation than in the baseline analysis. 
Observe that in this case presidential deviations to the left and the right 
do partially “cancel each other out,”
93 but only if bureaucratic insulation is 
set an the appropriate intermediate level. If bureaucratic insulation is too 
high, then the bureaucracy’s initial bias will be too “sticky” for presidents to 
undo. If bureaucratic insulation is too low (or if presidential influence is 
only temporary), then each president can effectively write on a blank slate, 
and policy outcomes will jump sharply to the left and right as the presidency 
changes hands. With a moderate level of bureaucratic insulation and lasting 
presidential influence, random variations in the policy goals of different 
presidents will tend to cancel each other out because later presidents will 
partially but not completely undo the work of their predecessors. 
Conclusion 
Many legal doctrines and political institutions, as well as many proposed 
doctrinal and institutional reforms, are premised on the belief that increasing 
the influence of the entities that are most responsive to majoritarian prefer-
ences will increase the majoritarian responsiveness of policy outcomes. The 
dominant strain of this view argues that majoritarian values favor maximiz-
ing the president’s influence over bureaucratic policymaking through a 
combination of broad presidential appointment and removal powers, super-
visory and directive authority, agency organization, and judicial deference to 
agency decisions that reflect presidential priorities. On this view, appropri-
ate limits on presidential authority to control the bureaucracy, if any, must 
derive from values other than democratic majoritarianism, from a rejection 
of the notion that the president is more responsive to national majorities 
than the bureaucracy or Congress, or from special considerations such as the 
presence of a serious credible commitment problem. The view that majori-
tarian values favor greater political control of the bureaucracy is not limited 
to strong presidentialists, however. Many who advocate greater congres-
sional control over the bureaucracy similarly presume that bureaucratic 
insulation from political influence reduces the majoritarian responsiveness 
of bureaucratic policy outcomes. 
This Article has argued that this widespread belief is flawed. The presi-
dent and other elected officials may be responsive to majoritarian 
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preferences, but they are not perfectly responsive. As a result, voters are 
better off if it is costly, but not impossible, for the president to influence the 
bureaucracy. Even though bureaucratic insulation biases the expected policy 
outcome away from the median voter’s ideal, it also reduces the variance in 
outcomes relative to what would occur under absolute presidential control. 
Up to a point, a majority of voters benefits more from the reduction in vari-
ance than they suffer from the increase in expected policy bias. This might 
be thought of as an old-fashioned argument for separation of powers,
94 re-
cast in the language of statistical decision theory: shared power over policy 
decisions mutes the impact of random non-majoritarian shocks to each deci-
sion maker’s policy preferences. 
This does not mean that strong presidentialists and others are necessarily 
wrong when they argue that majoritarian considerations favor greater politi-
cal control of the administration than currently exists, or when they argue 
that such considerations militate against increases in bureaucratic autonomy. 
After all, if majoritarian interests are best served by an intermediate level of 
bureaucratic insulation, it is entirely possible that the current level of politi-
cal control in some domains is either too low or just right. Nor does this 
Article say anything directly about which types of legal or institutional re-
forms are the most just or efficient means of achieving a given level of 
bureaucratic insulation. The analysis does, however, undermine the claim 
that increasing the authority of a politically responsive official, such as the 
president, over a politically unresponsive agency will always lead to more 
majoritarian policymaking. Legal or policy recommendations—for strong 
presidentialism or anything else—require a more nuanced assessment of the 
majoritarian costs and benefits of bureaucratic insulation. In particular, such 
recommendations must be sensitive not only to expected outcomes under 
different institutional arrangements but also to the variance in expected out-
comes under such arrangements. 
The analysis does provide some guidance as to when we should expect 
the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation to be high or low. Many of these 
predictions are straightforward. The majoritarian interest in strong presiden-
tial control is stronger when expected presidential responsiveness to 
majoritiarian preferences is stronger, when political parties are less polar-
ized, when bureaucratic preferences are more distant from majoritarian 
preferences, and when the majority’s political interests change relatively 
rapidly. These variables may be difficult to quantify with precision, but it 
may be possible to make rough qualitative estimates, as well as to assess 
change over time. This evidence may be useful in designing appropriate 
institutions in different circumstances. 
The extensions considered in Section II.C suggest several additional hy-
potheses, some of which are less obvious. First, when presidential struggles 
for control of the bureaucracy impose costs on voters by distracting the 
president from other tasks, the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation tends 
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to be more extreme—closer to either total agency autonomy or absolute 
presidential control—because aggregate control costs are lowest when the 
president either does not try to influence the bureaucracy or can do so at no 
cost. 
Second, voters view bureaucratic insulation and direct political monitor-
ing of the president as partial substitutes: both are costly means for reducing 
the variance of bureaucratic outcomes. Thus voters will engage in less fre-
quent or intense direct monitoring when the bureaucracy is heavily 
insulated. Further, voters will prefer greater bureaucratic insulation when it 
is more difficult for voters to monitor a president’s activities. 
Third, strategic voters can offset the costs of bureaucratic insulation by 
selecting a “biased” president who will invest substantial effort to shift bu-
reaucratic policy despite the costs of doing so. If voters engage in this sort 
of strategic behavior, the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation may be 
considerably higher than what one would expect if voters simply try to se-
lect a president with similar preferences. 
Fourth, when bureaucratic policy issues persist over a longer period of 
time, optimal bureaucratic insulation tends to be lower if presidential influ-
ence is purely temporary. If each president can effect more lasting changes 
in bureaucratic preferences, however, optimal bureaucratic insulation may 
actually be higher for long-term issues than for short-term issues. 
These results have application beyond the debates over strong presiden-
tialism. For instance, they suggest a different perspective on longstanding 
debates over congressional preferences about agency structure and adminis-
trative process.
95 This Article suggests that electoral majorities might prefer 
administrative institutions that are somewhat insulated from, but somewhat 
responsive to, existing legislative majorities. Such institutions balance vot-
ers’ interest in ensuring that their preferences influence administrative 
decisions on an ongoing basis (because legislative majorities will tend, on 
average, to reflect the preferences of current majorities) with their interest in 
reducing the variance of bureaucratic outcomes (which can be exacerbated 
by congressional control insofar as legislative preferences usually diverge 
somewhat from majoritarian preferences). The analysis of optimal   
                                                                                                                      
  95.  One position holds that Congress prefers administrative structures and processes that 
insulate agencies from ongoing congressional influence, because members of the enacting coalition 
want to “lock in” policy gains by rendering their decision harder to undo by future Congresses. See 
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and 
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431 
(1989); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in Can the Government Govern? 
267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural 
Choice: Towards a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in Organization Theory 116 (Oliver E. Wil-
liamson ed., 1990). Attempts to model this “policy insulation” theory formally have yielded 
important limitations and qualifications. See Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral Competition, 
Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 321 (2002). An alternative per-
spective argues that Congress chooses structures and processes to maximize Congress’s ability to 
monitor agencies on an ongoing basis. See Bressman, supra note 17; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 
supra; Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165 (1984). Interestingly, these hypotheses are 
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bureaucratic insulation may also have applications outside the administra-
tive context. For example, it may contribute to our understanding of when 
and to what extent courts should be insulated from the influence of the 
elected branches of government.
96 
The analysis in this Article is, of course, limited. It considers only a par-
ticular comparative institutional question—how much relative authority 
should be allocated to politically accountable politicians and politically un-
accountable bureaucrats—without asking the global question of whether 
some other set of institutional arrangements would serve majoritarian inter-
ests even better. Also, by focusing only on an abstract case with a single 
politician and a single bureaucrat, the Article skirts difficult questions about 
the appropriate allocation of authority across a larger number of institutional 
actors. Moreover, the Article has deliberately bracketed vital questions about 
the appropriate normative objectives for institutional designers, considering 
instead only a simple, perhaps crude, version of majoritarianism. Despite 
these limitations, the analysis has shown that even under assumptions that 
would seem to favor maximum political control of the bureaucracy, a mod-
erate level of bureaucratic insulation advances the interests of a majority of 
voters. This central finding, its underlying logic, and the implications that 
follow from it all suggest that many common assertions regarding the rela-
tionship between alternative institutional arrangements and important 
democratic values are incomplete or false. 
                                                                                                                      
 96.  See James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-
Judicial Interaction, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 84 (2001); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the 
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 Int’l Rev. 
L. & Econ. 349 (1993); Matthew C. Stephenson, Court of Public Opinion: Government Account-
ability and Judicial Independence, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 379 (2004); Matthew C. Stephenson, 
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Appendix  
A. Players and Order of Play 
Consider a simple policymaking game with three players: a representa-
tive voter (V), a president (P), and the bureaucracy (B). The game consists 
of two time periods indexed by t={0,1}, which can be thought of as the “in-
stitutional design” stage (t=0) and the “policymaking” stage (t=1). 
During the institutional design stage, a bureaucracy is created to make a 
policy decision x1∈R. The voter’s initial ideal point is v0=0. The bureauc-
racy’s initial ideal point is b0; the absolute value of b0 can be thought of as 
“initial bureaucratic bias.” At the institutional design stage, the voter (or an 
institutional designer interested in maximizing expected voter utility) selects 
a level of bureaucratic insulation, β∈[0,1]. Although β is partly a function of 
b0, it does not matter whether β is selected before or after b0. If b0 is deter-
mined before β, then b0 can be interpreted as the actual level of initial 
bureaucratic bias. If b0 is determined after β, then one can assume that initial 
bureaucratic bias is drawn from a known distribution with mean 0 and vari-
ance b0
2. 
At the beginning of the policymaking stage (t=1), the voter’s prefer-
ences may shift. Formally, the voter’s period 1 ideal point is v1=v0+ε1, 
where ε1 is a random variable drawn from a known distribution with mean 
0 and variance ρ
2. The parameter ρ
2 can be thought of as a measure of 
“voter preference instability.” Next, a president is chosen. The president’s 
ideal point is p1=v1+α1, where α1 is drawn from a known distribution with 
mean 0 and variance σ
2. The parameter σ
2 can be thought of as a measure 
of “expected presidential responsiveness,” where low values of σ
2 indicate 
strong responsiveness and high values of σ
2 denote weak responsiveness. 
Absent presidential intervention, the bureaucracy’s ideal point in the poli-
cymaking stage, b1, would remain equal to b0.
97 The president, however, 
can take costly action to select a different b1. The utility cost to the presi-
dent is β(1−β)
-1(b1−b0)
2. After the president exerts her influence, the 
bureaucracy implements the final policy outcome, x1, and all three players 
receive their final utility payoffs. 
To summarize, the order of play is as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                      
  97.  The analysis is robust to allowing for random variation in the bureaucracy’s ideal point 
prior to presidential action. To see this, assume that the voter’s period 1 ideal point is v1=v0+εv and 
that εv is a random draw from some distribution with mean 0 and variance ρv
2. (Note that the only 
change so far is the addition of the v subscripts.) Next, assume that the bureaucracy’s ideal point at 
the start of period 1 is b1=b0+εb, where εb is a random draw from some distribution with mean 0 and 
variance ρb
2. We can redefine ε1 as equal to (εv−εb). The mean of this distribution is 0. The variance, 
which we can denote by ρ
2 as in the main text, is E(εv
2+εb
2−2εvεb)−E(εv−εb)
2=ρv
2+ρb
2−2cov(εvεb). 
While the main exposition and analysis assumes that ρb
2=0 (or that cov(εvεb)=ρb
2/2), the results can 
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Period 1 (Institutional Design Stage) 
A bureaucracy is created. This bureaucracy is characterized by a level   
of initial bureaucratic bias (b0) and a level of insulation from political   
influence (β). 
Period 2 (Policymaking Stage) 
Step 1:  Voter preferences shift such that the voter’s new ideal point is 
  v1=ε1. 
Step 2:  The voter selects a president with ideal point p1=ε1+α1. 
Step  3:  The president exerts costly influence over the bureaucracy,   
  inducing a new bureaucratic ideal point b1. 
Step 4:  The bureaucracy implements policy x1 and all players receive 
  their final utility payoffs. 
B. Equilibrium Strategies 
1. Equilibrium Strategy of the Bureaucracy and the President 
Each player suffers a quadratic utility loss based on the distance be-
tween the final policy outcome and the player’s ideal point. That is, player 
j’s policy payoff is –(x1−j1)
2. 
The bureaucracy, which moves last, will choose x1
*=b1 in equilibrium. 
The president chooses b1 to maximize her expected utility, EU
P, where : 
() ()
2
1 0
2
1 1 1
b b p b EU
P −
−
− − − =
β
β
 (1) 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (1) captures the presi-
dent’s expected payoff from the policy outcome (using the fact that in 
equilibrium the bureaucracy will choose its ideal point, x1
*=b1). The second 
term captures the president’s utility loss from the effort expended in shifting 
the bureaucracy’s ideal point from b0 to b1. 
It follows from Equation (1) that in equilibrium the president will induce 
a bureaucratic ideal point, denoted b1
*, given by: 
() () ( )0 1 1 0 1
*
1 1 1 b b p b β α ε β β β + + − = + − =  (2) 
2. Optimal Bureaucratic Insulation in the Policymaking Stage 
This Article focuses primarily on the voter’s optimal β at the institu-
tional design stage. Before proceeding to that issue, it is useful to consider 
what the voter would prefer if she could choose β at the policymaking stage, 
after observing v1 and p1.  STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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The voter’s final utility, U
v, is –(x1−v1)
2. Using the fact that v1=ε1 and that 
in equilibrium x1
*=b1
* and b1
* is given by Equation (2), and noting that 
p1=v1+α1=ε1+α1, this utility can be rewritten as: 
() () ( ) ( ) []
2
0 1 1 1
2
0 1 1 1 b p p v b U
V − − − − = + − − − = β β βε α β  (3) 
We can now calculate the voter’s optimal β at the policymaking stage, 
denoted β
*
PM. First, take the derivative of Equation (3) with respect to β, 
which yields: 
() ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−
−
− − = β
β 0 1
1 1 2
0 1 2
b p
p v
b p
d
dU
V
 (4) 
We can assume without loss of generality that b0ε0. If v1>p1>b0 or 
v1<p1<b0, then Equation (4) is strictly negative for all possible values of β, 
which implies β
*
PM=0. If v1>b0>p1 or v1<b0<p1, then Equation (4) is strictly 
positive for all possible values of β, which implies β
*
PM=1. Finally, if 
b0>v1>p1 or p1>v1>b0, the voter’s optimal β at the policymaking stage is: 
() 1 , 0
0 1
1 1 * ∈ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−
=
b p
v p
PM β  (5) 
3. Optimal Bureaucratic Insulation in the Institutional Design Stage 
The preceding subsection considered the voter’s optimal β at the poli-
cymaking stage, after v1 and p1 have been disclosed. In most cases, however, 
bureaucratic insulation is determined by institutional choices that cannot be 
revised easily. The remainder of the analysis therefore assumes that β must 
be chosen at the institutional design stage. At that stage, the voter’s expected 
utility is given by: 
() ( ) () ( )
2
0 1 1 1 1 b E EU
V β α ε β ε − + − − − =  (6) 
Making use of the facts that E(ε1)=E(α1)=0, that the covariance of ε1 and 
α1 is 0, that σ
2=E(α1
2)−E(α1)
2, and that ρ
2=E(ε1
2)−E(ε1)
2, the expression in 
Equation (6) simplifies to: 
() ( )
2
0
2 2 2 2 2 1 b EU
V β σ β ρ β + − + − =  (7) 
To solve for the voter’s optimal β, denoted β
*, take the derivative of  
Equation (7) with respect to β: 
() ()
2
0
2 2 2 1 2 2 b
d
dEU
V
β σ β βρ
β
+ − − − =  (8) 
By setting Equation (8) equal to 0, we can solve for β
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2
0
2 2
2
*
b + +
=
ρ σ
σ
β  (9)
98 
C. Extensions 
1. Social Costs of Bureaucratic Control Efforts 
The basic model assumed that the effort the president expends in influ-
encing  b1 only matters to the voter to the extent that it affects x1. It is 
possible, though, that the president’s bureaucratic control struggles might 
affect voter utility in other ways. To capture this idea formally, assume that 
the voter bears some utility cost proportional to the effort the president ex-
pends on bureaucratic control. The voter’s utility in this “costly effort” (CE) 
extension is: 
() ()
2
1 0
2
1 1 1
b b x v U
V
CE − ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
−
− − − =
β
β
λ  (10) 
The second term on the right-hand side of Equation (10) is the cost to 
the voter of presidential bureaucratic control efforts. The λ parameter cap-
tures the significance of effort costs, relative to policy outcomes, for the 
voter. Notice that the basic model can be considered a special case of the 
costly effort extension in which λ=0. 
As an initial matter, it is sensible to assume that although presidential 
struggles with the bureaucracy entail opportunity costs for the voter, the 
president weighs these costs more heavily than the voter does, i.e. 1>λ>0. 
After analyzing this case, we can examine the implications of λ values out-
side this range. 
Using Equation (10) and the equilibrium behavior of the president and 
bureaucracy derived earlier, the voter’s expected utility can be expressed as: 
() ()
() () ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+ + − +
− + +
− =
2
0
2 2
2 2 2
0
2 2
1
1
b
b
EU
V
CE
ρ σ β λβ
σ β ρ β
 (11) 
To find the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation under these assump-
tions, take the derivative of Equation (11) with respect to β, which yields: 
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() 0 2
2
0
2 2
2
1
2
< + + − = b
d
EU d
V
σ ρ
β
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()
() () ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
− + + +
+ − −
− =
β ρ σ λ
β σ β βρ
β 2 1
2 1 2 2
2
0
2 2
2
0
2 2
b
b
d
dEU
V
CE  (12) 
Setting this expression equal to 0 and solving for β yields the following 
expression for optimal level of bureaucratic insulation when presidential 
effort is costly to the voter, denoted βCE
*: 
() ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
+ + −
=
2 1
1
2
0
2 2
2
* λ
σ ρ
σ
λ
β
b
CE  (13)
99 
Note that because β must be in the [0,1] interval, Equation (13) will not 
always accurately characterize the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation. 
The derivative in Equation (12) is positive for all permissible values of β if: 
2
1
2
0
2 2
2 λ
ρ σ
σ
− >
+ + b
 (14) 
If this condition holds, the voter would prefer absolute bureaucratic in-
sulation (βCE
*=1). Likewise, the derivative of Equation (12) is always 
negative if: 
2
2
0
2 2
2 λ
ρ σ
σ
<
+ + b
 (15) 
If this condition holds, the voter would always prefer unfettered presi-
dential control of the bureaucracy (βCE
*=0). 
In both of these cases, the opportunity costs to the voter of presidential 
control efforts are high enough that the voter would prefer to eliminate these 
costs altogether either by giving the president total freedom of action or by 
providing for absolute bureaucratic insulation. The former strategy is prefer-
able if optimal bureaucratic insulation in the baseline case is relatively low 
(β
*<λ/2); the voter prefers the latter strategy if optimal bureaucratic insula-
tion in the baseline case is relatively high (β
*>1−λ/2). 
                                                                                                                      
  99.  We can verify that this expression maximizes rather than minimizes the voter’s expected 
utility by taking the second derivative with respect to β: 
() () 0 1 2
2
0
2 2
2
2
< + + − − = b
d
EU d
V
CE ρ σ λ
β
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When 1−λ/2>β
*>λ/2, we can calculate the difference between βCE
* and 
β
* by subtracting Equation (9) from Equation (13). Doing so yields: 
() ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
+ + −
= Δ
2
1
1
2
0
2 2
2
b
CE
σ ρ
σ
λ
λ
 (16) 
Because of the assumption that 1>λ>0, Equation (16) implies that when 
presidential control efforts entail positive opportunity costs for the voter, the 
voter’s optimal level of bureaucratic insulation is higher than in the baseline 
case if β
*>1/2, but lower if β
*<1/2. In the special case where β
*=1/2, effort 
costs have no effect on the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation. 
The preceding discussion assumed that although presidential control ef-
forts are costly to the voter, the voter treats these costs as less significant 
than does the president (i.e., 1>λ>0). Although that assumption seems sub-
stantively plausible, it is worth considering how the results change when 
presidential effort imposes costs on the voter that are equal to or greater 
than the costs to the president herself (λε1), and when the voter affirma-
tively benefits when the president is tied down in struggles over   
bureaucratic policy (λ<0). 
When λε1, the voter prefers either absolute presidential authority or ab-
solute bureaucratic autonomy. This follows straightforwardly from 
Inequalities (14) and (15): any non-zero level of presidential effort a losing 
proposition for the voter, because the president in equilibrium will always 
invest more effort in bureaucratic control than the voter would like. There-
fore, the voter will simply compare her expected utility when the president 
has total control over the bureaucracy (−σ
2) and her expected utility when 
the bureaucracy has complete autonomy (−(ρ
2+b0
2)). 
The assumption that λ>0 is based on the notion that presidential activity 
in areas other than bureaucratic control tends to increase expected voter util-
ity. Under the alternative assumption that the voter affirmatively benefits 
from higher presidential effort costs (λ<0), the optimal level of bureaucratic 
insulation is still given by Equation (13), and the difference between this 
level of insulation and the optimal level in the baseline case is still given by 
Equation (16). Because the sign on λ is reversed, however, the substantive 
results are quite different. When λ<0, the voter would like to induce greater 
presidential effort in order to distract the president from other activities. 
Hence, the presence of “negative opportunity costs” (or, perhaps less clum-
sily, “distraction benefits”) makes the voter prefer a more intermediate level 
of bureaucratic insulation. More formally, as λ decreases toward −∞, βCE
* 
converges to ½. 
A final issue to consider here is the possibility that the expected cost to 
the voter of presidential control efforts (λ) and the expected political re-
sponsiveness of the president (σ
2) might be correlated. Perhaps stronger 
mechanisms of political accountability in one area—bureaucratic policy—
imply a greater likelihood that the policies the president’s policy agenda in 
other areas will reflect voter preferences, which would imply that presiden-STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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tial control efforts impose greater opportunity costs on the voter. To explore 
the implications of a negative correlation between λ and σ
2, assume that: 
2 1
1
σ
λ
+
=  (17) 
The selection of this particular functional form is arbitrary, but it has the 
desirable feature that λ is decreasing in σ
2 at an decreasing rate (dλ/dσ
2<0 
d
2λ/d(σ
2)
2>0), and the voter and the president weigh effort costs equally 
when the president is perfectly responsive to voter interests (σ
2=0 ⇒ λ=1). 
Substituting this expression for λ into Equation (13) and rearranging terms 
yields: 
2 2
0
2 2
2
*
2
1 1
σ σ ρ
σ
β −
+ +
+
=
b
CE  (18) 
As before, because β is bounded between 0 and 1, Equation (18) will not 
always characterize the optimum. We can use the same approach adopted 
earlier to determine βCE
* when Equation (18) generates a solution outside the 
permissible range. First, substituting the expression for λ in Equation (17) 
into Inequality (14) indicates that βCE
*=1 if: 
) 1 ( 2
2 1
2
2
2 2
0
2
2
σ
σ
σ ρ
σ
+
+
>
+ +b
 (19) 
Similarly, substituting the expression for λ in Equation (17) into Ine-
quality (15) indicates that βCE
*=0 if: 
()
2 2 2
0
2
2
1 2
1
σ σ ρ
σ
+
<
+ +b
 (20) 
The qualitative result in this case is similar to the earlier case, except 
that the ranges in which the voter prefers total presidential authority or total 
bureaucratic autonomy are determined in part by the degree of presidential 
responsiveness to voter preferences. As for the case where βCE
* is given by 
Equation (18), we can assess how the introduction of opportunity costs of 
presidential effort affects the voter’s optimal level of bureaucratic insulation 
by subtracting Equation (9) from Equation (18), which yields: 
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
+ +
= −
+ +
= Δ
2
1 1
2
1 1
2
0
2 2
2
2 2 2
0
2 2 b b
CE
σ ρ
σ
σ σ σ ρ
 (21) 
This expression makes clear that the qualitative results are the same as 
before: when the voter internalizes some of the president’s effort costs, op-
timal bureaucratic insulation tends to be pushed toward the extremes. 
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bureaucratic insulation relative to the baseline case depends on whether β
* is 
greater or less than ½. In this case, though, the degree of the difference now 
depends on the ratio between σ
2 and (ρ
2+b0
2). When σ
2 is small, introducing 
effort costs to the voter will have a strong effect on optimal bureaucratic 
insulation. But when σ
2 is large, the difference between optimal bureaucratic 
insulation in the baseline case and in the costly effort case is smaller. 
2. Alternate Methods of Accountability 
The baseline analysis assumed that σ
2 is independent of β. This assump-
tion is open to the following challenge: The expected deviation between p1 
and v1 is due in part to how carefully the voter scrutinizes the president’s 
actions and how aggressively the voter takes action to influence presidential 
preferences. If these monitoring and lobbying efforts are costly to the voter, 
then the voter’s willingness to engage in such activities might depend on the 
degree to which presidential preferences actually influence bureaucratic pol-
icy outcomes. To address this issue formally, assume that at Step 1 of the 
policymaking stage the voter can choose to employ one of two levels of 
scrutiny, “low” or “high.” Each level of scrutiny is associated with a differ-
ent degree of presidential responsiveness, denoted σH
2 and σL
2, where 
σH
2<σL
2. Different levels of scrutiny entail different costs to the voter. The 
cost of low scrutiny is normalized to 0; the cost of high scrutiny is κ>0. Un-
der these assumptions (and making the arbitrary tie-breaking assumption 
that in the case of indifference the voter chooses low scrutiny), the voter 
chooses high scrutiny at Step 1 if and only if: 
() ( ) () ( ) κ ρ β σ β ρ β σ β + + + − > + + −
2
0
2 2 2 2 2
0
2 2 2 2 1 1 b b H L  (22) 
This condition can be re-written as: 
2 2 1
H L σ σ
κ
β
−
− <  (23) 
Inequality (23) captures the straightforward conclusion that the voter is 
more likely to choose high scrutiny when the monitoring and lobbying cost 
(κ) is low, when the benefit in terms of greater presidential responsiveness 
(σL
2−σH
2) is high, and when the level of bureaucratic insulation (β) is low. 
For convenience, denote the right-hand side of Inequality (23) as τ. 
To calculate the voter’s optimal β, we must take into account the effect 
of different levels of insulation on the voter’s monitoring and lobbying deci-
sion. Before doing so, however, it is useful to derive the voter’s optimal β 
when the subsequent level of scrutiny is taken as given. These calculations 
follow straightforwardly from Equation (9). If the voter is certain to choose 
high scrutiny in the policymaking stage, then the voter prefers: STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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2
0
2 2
2
*
b H
H
H
+ +
=
ρ σ
σ
β  (24) 
Similarly, if the voter is certain to choose low scrutiny in the policymak-
ing stage, the voter would prefer: 
2
0
2 2
2
*
b L
L
L
+ +
=
ρ σ
σ
β  (25) 
We can now calculate the optimal β in the “endogenous scrutiny” (ES) 
extension, denoted βES
*, by considering separately three cases. First, con-
sider the case where: 
τ β β < <
* *
L H  (26) 
In this case, βES
*=βH
*. The reasoning is as follows. Because β=βH
* satis-
fies Inequality (23), the voter could rationally choose β=βH
* in the 
institutional design stage and apply high scrutiny in the policymaking stage. 
In contrast, because β=βL
* also satisfies Inequality (23), the voter cannot 
rationally choose β=βL
* in the institutional design stage and then apply low 
scrutiny in the policymaking stage. If β=βL
* under the conditions specified in 
Inequality (26), the voter’s rational choice at the policymaking stage is high 
scrutiny. In order to induce low scrutiny, the voter would have to select some 
βετ. Furthermore, because the voter’s expected utility is decreasing in β for 
values of β above the optimum,
100 the highest expected utility the voter can 
achieve without inducing high scrutiny is realized when the voter chooses 
β=τ. However, we know that this expected utility is lower than what the 
voter could achieve by setting β=βH
* and applying high scrutiny, because the 
voter is indifferent between high scrutiny and low scrutiny at β=τ, and β=βH
* 
with high scrutiny gives the voter higher expected utility than β=τ with high 
scrutiny. So when Inequality (26) holds, the voter would prefer to impose 
lower bureaucratic insulation (βH
*) at the institutional design stage and sub-
ject the president to high scrutiny at the policymaking stage. 
Next, consider the case where: 
τ β β ≥ >
* *
H L  (27) 
In this case, βES
*=βL
*. When Inequality (27) holds, the voter can ration-
ally select βL
* and low scrutiny. In contrast, the voter will not select high 
scrutiny when β<τ≤βH
*. The highest expected utility the voter can achieve 
with a β<τ is still worse than the best the voter can do with βL
* and low scru-
tiny. This follows from three facts: (1) the voter’s utility under βL
* with low 
scrutiny is greater than her utility from β=τ with low scrutiny; (2) voter util-
ity is increasing in β for all β<τ; and (3) at β=τ, the voter is indifferent 
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between low and high scrutiny. Thus when Inequality (27) holds, the voter 
would prefer greater bureaucratic insulation (βL
*) coupled with lower scru-
tiny of the president at the policymaking stage. 
The final case to consider is where: 
* *
H L β τ β > ≥  (28) 
In this case, both βL
* and βH
* are local maxima for the voter’s expected 
utility function. If β=βH
*, the voter will rationally choose high scrutiny; if 
β=βL
*, the voter will rationally choose low scrutiny. Determining whether 
βES
* is equal to βL
* or βH
* requires a comparison of the voter’s expected utility 
in each of these two cases. When Inequality (28) holds, βES
*=βH
* if and only 
if: 
() ()
2
0
2 * 2 2 * 2 2 *
2
0
2 *
2 2 * 2 2 *
1
1
b
b
L L L L
H
H H H β σ β ρ β
κ β
σ β ρ β
+ − + < ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+ +
− +
 (29) 
Inequality (29) can be re-written as: 
2
0
2
2 * 2 *
b
H L
+
> −
ρ
κ
β β  (30) 
Therefore, if Inequalities (28) and (30) both hold, βES
*=βH
*; if Inequality 
(28) holds but Inequality (30) does not, βES
*=βL
*. All else equal, Inequality 
(30) is more likely to hold when monitoring and lobbying costs (κ) are low 
and when the efficacy of scrutiny (σL
2−σH
2) is high. 
3. Strategic Voter Selection of Biased Presidents 
The baseline model assumed that the president’s ideal point is equal to 
the voter’s ideal point plus some random error (p1=v1+α1). This notion of 
political responsiveness implies that the voter will always favor a president 
with an ideal point as close as possible to the voter’s ideal point. This simple 
notion of accountability, however, is problematic. If the president must over-
see a bureaucracy that does not share the voter’s preferences, a strategic 
voter might prefer a biased president. This extension explores how the opti-
mal β differs when the voter can bias the distribution from which p1 is drawn 
away from v1. In particular, assume that p1=v1+μ+α1, where μ is the level of 
“presidential bias,” selected strategically by the voter prior to Step 2 of the 
policymaking stage. That is, the voter selects μ after observing b0 and β, but 
before learning α1. For simplicity, assume that the selection of μ does not 
impose any direct costs on the voter. 
Working backwards, we first calculate the bureaucratic ideal point the 
president will induce at Step 3 of the policymaking stage by taking the de-
rivative of Equation (1) with respect to b1, substituting in p1=ε1+μ+α1, and STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC 9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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setting the resulting expression equal to 0. Doing so yields the bureaucracy’s 
equilibrium ideal point in the “strategic voting” (SV) extension, bSV
*: 
() ( )0 1 1
* 1 b bSV β α μ ε β + + + − =  (31) 
We can substitute this expression into Equation (3) to derive the follow-
ing expression for the voter’s utility: 
()() ()
2
0 1 1 1 1 b U
V
SV β βε μ β α β + − − + − − =  (32) 
The expected utility for the voter at the beginning of the policymaking 
stage (the moment when the voter must select μ) is therefore: 
() ()
( ) () () ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
− + − − +
+ −
− = − 2
1 0
2
1 0
2 2 2
1 2
1
ε β ε μ β β
μ σ β
b b
EU
V
SV PM  (33) 
By taking the derivative with of Equation (33) with respect to μ, we can 
calculate the level of presidential bias a rational voter would select in equi-
librium, denoted μ
*: 
() 1 0
*
1
ε
β
β
μ − ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
−
− = b  (34) 
Notice two features of μ
*. First, it is proportional to, but has the opposite 
sign as, the sum of the bureaucracy’s initial bias (b0) and the voter’s period 1 
ideal point (ε1). In other words, a strategic voter prefers a president whose 
bias goes in the opposite direction as the bureaucracy’s bias at the beginning 
of period 1 (after the voter’s preferences have shifted). Second, μ
* is increas-
ing in β. The more the bureaucracy is shielded from presidential control, the 
more the voter prefers a president whose ideal point deviates from the 
voter’s. 
We derive the voter’s utility, when she induces her optimal level of 
presidential bias, by substituting the expression for μ
* from Equation (34) 
into Equation (32), which yields: 
() ()
2
1 1 α β − − =
V
SV U  (35) 
Thus the voter’s expected utility at the institutional design stage is: 
()
2 2 1 σ β − − = −
V
SV ID EU  (36) 
Equation (36) implies that when the voter can strategically bias the pres-
ident without bearing additional costs for doing so, the voter prefers that the 
bureaucracy be almost completely free from presidential control (i.e., βSV
* is 
infinitesimally below 1). The reason is that the voter can offset the costs 
associated with bureaucratic insulation simply by increasing the bias of the STEPHENSON FINAL PRINT M.DOC.DOC   9/8/2008 10:01 AM 
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president in the opposite direction. Thus the voter’s only interest is in reduc-
ing the impact of σ
2 on the final outcome. As β approaches 1, the variance of 
the policy outcome goes to 0 (although if β=1 then the president cannot in-
fluence the bureaucracy at all, and the voter would not be able to offset 
bureaucratic bias). 
4. Longer Time Horizons 
The baseline model included a single policymaking stage. This exten-
sion considers how the results change in a multi-period model with three 
periods indexed by t={0,1,2}. As before, period t=0 is the institutional de-
sign stage and period t=1 is a policymaking stage. Period t=2 is a second 
policymaking stage. At the beginning of period 2, voter preferences may 
shift again: the voter’s period 2 ideal point is v2=v1+ε2, where ε2 is an inde-
pendent draw from a distribution with mean 0 and variance ρ
2. The period 2 
president’s ideal point is p2=v2+α2, where α2 is independently drawn from a 
distribution with mean 0 and variance σ
2. The president then selects a new 
bureaucratic ideal point, b2, and the bureaucracy selects a new policy, x2. The 
president in each period is treated as a separate player that cares only about 
her utility payoff in that period; the same is true of the bureaucracy.
101 The 
voter’s utility is the sum of her payoffs in periods 1 and 2. 
In order to compare the voter’s optimal β in this extension to the base-
line model, we must make some further assumptions regarding whether the 
modifications in the bureaucracy’s ideal point induced by the period 1 presi-
dent “stick” in period 2. One possibility is that a president’s influence on 
bureaucratic preferences lasts only as long as that president is in office; once 
the president departs, the bureaucracy’s ideal point reverts to its initial value, 
b0, until the new president exerts her influence. An alternative possibility is 
that each president’s influence on the bureaucracy lasts until future presi-
dential action. On this view, the bureaucracy’s default ideal point in period 2 
is b1 rather than b0. The analysis will consider each of these possibilities. 
In the “temporary influence” (TI) case, where each president’s influence 
over bureaucratic policy preferences lasts only as long as that president is in 
office, the president in equilibrium will induce the following period 2 bu-
reaucratic ideal point: 
() 0 2
*
2 1 b p b TI β β + − = −  (37) 
This means that the voter’s utility in the second policymaking stage is: 
() ( ) ( ) ()
2
2 1 0 2 2 1 2 1 ε ε β α ε ε β + − + + + − − = − b U
V
TI  (38) 
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At the institutional design stage, then, the voter’s expected period 2 util-
ity is: 
() ( )
2 2
0
2 2 2
2 2 1 ρ β σ β + − − − = − b EU
V
TI  (39) 
The voter’s total expected utility in the “temporary influence” version of 
the three-period model is simply the sum of Equations (7) and (39). We can 
calculate the optimal β by taking the derivative of this sum with respect to β. 
Doing so yields: 
2 2
0
2
2
*
2
3
ρ σ
σ
β
+ +
=
b
TI  (40) 
Except in the special case where ρ=0, the optimal β is lower in the mul-
ti-period model with temporary presidential influence than in the basic 
model (i.e. βTI
*<βID
*). 
In the case where each president has a “lasting influence” (LI) over bu-
reaucratic policy preferences, the period 2 president will induce the 
following bureaucratic ideal point in equilibrium: 
() () () () 0 1 2 1 2
*
2 1 1 1 b p p b p b LI β β β β β β + − + − = + − = −  (41) 
Thus the voter’s utility in the second policymaking stage is: 
() ( )
() ( ) () ( )
2
2 1 0 1 1
2 2 1
2 1
1
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
+ − + + − +
+ + −
− = − ε ε β α ε β β
α ε ε β
b
U
V
LI  (42) 
At the institutional design stage, then, the voter’s expected period 2 util-
ity is: 
() () ()
2
0
4 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 b EU
V
LI β ρ β β σ β β + + + − + = −  (43) 
Rather than solving directly for the optimal β (denoted βLI
*), we can ver-
ify the existence of a unique βLI
* between 0 and 1, and then evaluate whether 
it is greater or less than β
*. First, taking the derivative of the expected value 
of the multi-period game (the sum of Equations (7) and (43)) with respect to 
β yields: 
() ()
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1 2 3 2
1
2
b
b
d
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β ρ β β
σ β β β
β σ β βρ
β
 (44) 
Evaluating this expression at β=0 yields 4σ
2 >
 0, while evaluating the ex-
pression at β=1 yields −(8ρ
2 +
 6b0
2)
 <
 0. Next, the second derivative of the 
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 (45) 
From these two facts it follows that there a unique βLI
* between 0 and 1 
that maximizes the voter’s expected utility in the lasting influence case. All 
that remains is to determine whether this βLI
* is greater or less than β
*. To do 
this, we can evaluate Equation (44) at β=β
*. A positive value implies βLI
*>β
*. 
To see why, note first that βLI
* is the value of β for which Equation (45) is 
equal to 0. Because Equation (45) establishes that this derivative is decreas-
ing in β, if Equation (44) is positive at β=β
*, it must be equal to 0 at some 
β>βID
*. By similar logic, if Equation (44) is negative at β=β
 *, then it must be 
that βLI
*<βID
*. If Equation (45) is equal to 0 at β=β
*, then βLI
*=βID
*. Evaluating 
Equation (44) at β=β
* yields:  
()
()
() ( ) ()
2 2
0
2 2
0
2
2 2
0
2 2
2
* 2
b b
b d
dEU
V
LI − − ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+ +
− = = ρ σ
ρ σ
σ
β β
β
 (46) 
This sign of this expression depends on the sign of: 
( )
4
0
2 2
0
2 b b − − ≡ ρ σ γ  (47) 
If γ≤0, Equation (46) is weakly positive, implying βLI
*εβ
*. This holds 
true if (1) σ
2≤b0
2; or (2) σ
2>b0
2 and ρ
2≤(b0
4/(σ
2−b0
2). If γ
 >0, Equation (45) is 
negative, implying βLI
*<β
*. This holds true if σ
2>b0
2 and ρ
2>(b0
4/(σ
2−b0
2). 
Substantively, these results indicate that if the president has a lasting influ-
ence over bureaucratic preferences, adding additional policymaking periods 
strengthens the interest in bureaucratic insulation if presidential responsive-
ness is strong (σ
2 low), initial bureaucratic drift is relatively large (b0
2 high), 
and voter preferences are relatively stable (ρ
2 low). In contrast, the voter’s 
interest in bureaucratic insulation is weaker in the multi-period model if 
presidential responsiveness is weak (σ
2 high), initial bureaucratic drift is not 
too severe (b0
2 low), and voter preferences are unstable (ρ
2 high). 